


MARINE CORPS



Gazette

DECEMBER, 1947

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This Month's Cover

IN THE LAST TWO GREAT WARS the United States has been forced to impose her will on the continent of Europe. Now with planning being done on a tri-dimensional, global scale, even this huge target is over-limited. Borrowing a page from the geopolitician's book we must learn to think in terms of heart lands and peripheries. Maj Guy Richards has done this thinking very well in his *Target Eurasia and the Next War* which begins on page 10.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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
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


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
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PASSING IN REVIEW

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

The Old Master . . .

MAHAN ON SEA POWER—William E. Livesey.
334 pages. Norman, Oklahoma: University of
Oklahoma Press. \$3.50

A critical evaluation of the writings and influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan has long been needed. Mr Livesey has performed a significant service in helping fill a great void in our nation's military library. For all too long the name of Mahan has been associated popularly with some out of print books about the influence of sea power, all of which apparently had some academic significance, but which "obviously" were of little importance since warfare has expanded into the third dimension. This book is a forceful rebuttal to those who have so willingly relegated Mahan and his doctrine of sea power to the era terminated by Orville and Wilbur Wright's experiments at Kitty Hawk.

Only in the matter of naval tactics—a minor portion of his writings—were Mahan's writings dated. His basic concepts, because they were the products of keen historical synthesis, were dateless and ageless. He viewed history in terms of broad principles and great movements. Mahan was a geopolitician before the word came into being, and he was writing in terms of geopolitical principles before Mackinder delivered his historic lecture on "The Geopolitical Pivot of History" and before Karl Haushofer warped such principles to the mold of Nazi ideology.

The horizons of Mahan's vision were indeed broad. The control of the Caribbean, the need for a canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific, the strategic importance of Hawaii in the struggle for the Pacific—all were subjects on which he wrote voluminously and prophetically. He quickly recognized the implications of Russian activity in North China and Manchuria and he was not hesitant in pointing to our vital interest in what happened on the western rim of the Pacific.

The increasingly important influence of the Pacific islands and littoral upon United States security was a guiding consideration in the geopolitical thinking of both Mahan and his gifted contemporary, Homer Lea. A careful reading of Mahan's observations regarding a proper United States attitude toward the Orient would help eliminate a large amount of our muddled thinking with respect to China. Mahan's attitude toward the question of the Far East is fully discussed by Mr Livesey in a separate chapter.

In addition to giving the reader a clearer picture of Mahan as a person, this book accomplishes another, and probably more important, objective: it clarifies "sea power" in the sense in which Mahan used the term. Such a clarification of Mahan's concept of sea power is urgently needed today, for never has thinking regarding our national military policies been more unsettled. When even the need for a navy is questioned at high service levels, it is high time that Mahan's concept should be brought into proper perspective.

Mahan's concept of sea power involved much more than the ships of a nation's fleet. His version of sea power embraced all the factors—military, economic, political, geographical, and social—that influenced the control of the sea. Based upon such broad considerations, it is understandable why Mahan's concept of sea power has stood the test of a half century of international violence. As the author is careful to point out, events of both world wars have substantiated Mahan's basic contentions. Sea power and its resultant control of the seas, gained if necessary by application of force, meant "predominant influence in the world." Mahan's thinking in this respect is still particularly applicable to the United States, a nation largely bordered by seas, control of which protects against invasion and permits projection of military forces against an enemy.

A significant portion of the book discusses the

Any book reviewed may be purchased through the Gazette Bookshop

extent to which Mahan's writings influenced the military thinking of England, France, Germany, and Japan. As one reads how deeply Mahan influenced those who determined the military policy of the great powers, it becomes increasingly apparent that Mahan is the only American who could take his place alongside Jomini and Clausewitz as a military author and philosopher. Students of military history will be interested in the author's account of the extent to which Mahan's strategical thinking was influenced by Jomini. However, Mr Livesey is not the first to reveal Mahan's indebtedness to the Swiss general, for Jomini's influence on Mahan has been previously discussed in Edward Mead Earle's *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

This book is largely devoted to analysis of Mahan's 20-odd volumes and a 100-odd magazine articles, all written between 1890 and 1914. Frequent excerpts from the books and articles, as well as excerpts from Mahan's personal correspondence, are included in the text.

Mahan on Sea Power is an important book. It should be read by every officer regardless of his branch of service. But it won't be; books like *The Case Against the Admirals*, however detrimental they may be to the formulation of sound military thought, will continue to be more to the liking of a sizeable portion of military readers.

JDH

Problems of Command . . .

MEN AGAINST FIRE—Col S. L. A. Marshall, USA. 211 pages, not illustrated. New York: William Morrow and Company. \$2.75

The purpose of this book appears to be to set forth some of the physical and psychological facets of the problems of command in small combat units. *Men Against Fire* is short, honest and carefully prepared. It is a study of some aspects of minor tactics and of small unit leadership.

The author opens his book with the thesis that man remains the important element on the field of combat and then proceeds to show that, in spite of new trends and developments, the final decision in war can only be reached by ground forces on the battlefield. This, of course, is not a new thesis but it is certainly one which bears restating, and the author does a good job.

The most controversial argument advanced in the book revolves around a discussion of the de-

velopment of small unit fire-power. The author contends that his investigations establish conclusively that in platoons, companies and battalions only 25 per cent of those who are in a position, and whose duty it is, to fire upon the enemy will do so. Marine small unit commanders will certainly take violent exception to this contention. No Marine units can accept any such combat standards as that. Unfortunately for the strength of the author's case he cites the performance of the landing force in the seizure of Makin Island to bolster his argument. In this brief action a landing force strength of 6470 was pitted against a Japanese strength of less than 600 soldiers and aviation ground personnel plus about 200 Korean laborers. Since air, naval gunfire, and artillery accounted for at least some of these, there could not possibly have been any serious resistance at any one time or place for such a landing force.

THE REAL STRENGTH of this book lies in its treatment of small unit leadership and morale. And while much of what the author advocates has been common practice in the Marine Corps for years yet it is well stated, logically developed and well worth reading. The importance of the individual fighting man, the evils of production line methods of handling men, the demoralizing impact of the I.B.M. machine solution upon personnel problems are all factors with which most Marine combat leaders are familiar, but it is good to see them well stated.

The author of *Men Against Fire*, Col S.L.A. Marshall, is a writer rather than a soldier by profession. But his experiences during the recent war qualify him to discuss the subject which he has chosen. He went to the Pacific in 1943 as a member of the Army historical section. He followed units that participated in the landings on Makin and Kwajalein and studied the detailed participation of small units in combat. Later he followed the same methods in Europe.

While *Men Against Fire* in no wise can be considered as a complete treatise on small unit tactics and leadership, it nevertheless is a worthwhile study which presents in an interesting and readable manner a number of very important lessons taught by the last war which will be even more important in the future. Officers and non-commissioned officers alike should find this an interesting and profitable bit of reading matter.

REH

Atomic Science . . .

ELEMENTARY NUCLEAR THEORY—Dr H. A. Bethe. 140 pages. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. \$2.50

This book is the first product of a long-range program devoted to the related aspects of the nuclear sciences. The publishers' plans call for a continuing series which eventually will cover, with varying treatments, virtually every aspect of nuclear studies.

Dr Bethe's book, while intended as an introduction to nuclear theory, is definitely slanted toward the student rather than the layman. Main headings: Descriptive Theory of Nuclei; Quantitative Theory of Nuclear Forces; Beta Disintegration; The Compound Nucleus. There is also a table of nuclear species.

The author, a professor of physics at Cornell University, worked on the Bomb at Los Alamos; however, his book is directed toward peacetime applications of atomic research. HS

The War of Dollars . . .

THE HIDDEN WEAPON: the Story of Economic Warfare—David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield. 238 pages. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$3.50

The authors of *The Hidden Weapon*, who held positions of importance in the Foreign Economic Administration, in this book set forth an authoritative account of the chief dealings of the United States during the war with the few neutrals still left in the world. The authors are, however, writing a book for popular information: they describe the methods used by the United States to prevent a flow of goods into the Axis countries; they do not explain how these operations were conducted or how the administration of them was handled from Washington.

When the United States entered the war, it first faced with Britain the problem of sealing off by blockade the flow of goods of all descriptions to the Axis countries. By an ingenious system of *navicerts* the Allies controlled the shipment of goods from the foreign ports themselves and enormously widened the range of their blockade—a curious extension of the Mahan theory of seapower. The Allies next had to prevent the diversion of products of strategical importance from the neutral countries into Germany or secure those products for themselves. Theoretical-

ly, Germany and the United States had equal rights within the neutral borders and the two opponents could meet in a free and competitive market. Actually, neutrality was a precarious thing which varied as the tides of fortune swung; it was not until the prospect of an Allied victory was established that the preponderance of influence swung to the Allies and they were able to enforce from the neutrals a quite un-neutral policy toward Germany.

There were only five important neutrals left in the world—all of them in Europe. Sweden had large stores of iron ore valuable to Germany and a well-developed ball-bearings industry. Switzerland had almost a world monopoly on certain types of precision instruments and jewel bearings; Spain and Portugal had large stores of wolfram, an ore of tungsten; and Turkey produced chromite. In the first years of the war three of these countries were under direct domination of Germany; two were frankly sympathetic to her cause. The United States and Great Britain, by a judiciously maintained system of pressure, compromises, and buying power, endeavored to keep these countries out of the Axis orbit and at the same time to deny their products to Germany. The Allies used preemptive buying, (outbidding the Germans and paying wholly uneconomic prices for goods that we did not need), various kinds of sabotage, secret channels of smuggling for securing things like industrial diamonds, and a careful amount of economic pressure—withholding from or rationing to the neutrals products essential to their industries unless the neutrals made certain concessions to them. In the latter years of the war when an Allied victory began to seem certain, pressures could be applied more successfully, and the band around Germany was drawn taut.

The authors say frankly that there is as yet no adequate way by which the effects of the economic blockade can be estimated. Germany had large stockpiles, great industrial flexibility and ingenuity, and the resources of the conquered countries to draw upon. Efforts of the economic warfare were indirect: large numbers of laborers had to be diverted from the war effort to produce food; quantities of essential products and manpower were used in devising and manufacturing expensive substitutes for scarce materials; and Germany's war objectives were altered. A need for petroleum rather than sound strategy was probably the reason for Germany's drive to the Caucasus in 1942. On the whole, the authors

conclude, the effort was satisfactory in terms of the comparatively small expense and the slight expenditure of manpower in administering the program.

The authors write a thoughtful and interesting account of economic warfare in World War II and cautiously evaluate their findings. For the military reader, however, the real interest of the book will lie in the changed concept of neutrality that emerges from the text, a change that is pointed out in the Foreword by Thomas K. Finletter, formerly Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. In a global war, a species of juridical neutrality may be preserved for the simple convenience of all contestants. When nations fight for survival, the polite conceptions of the 18th century go by the board, and all economic barriers are knocked down. With the economic interdependence of all portions of the globe during a war firmly established by this last conflict, it will be necessary to recast our entire thinking about neutrality: to prepare either for united methods of preserving the peace or for complete indiscriminating war that will involve every land mass where men live.

PDC


British Leadership . . .

THE GENERAL—C. S. Forester, 263 pages. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. — \$2.50

C. S. Forester is, of course, best known to his American readers for his Captain Hornblower series. His earlier, and in many ways more significant novels, are less widely known. Of particular interest to military readers are *Rifleman Dodd* and *The Gun*, two short novels published in one book, and *The General*. Significantly, the late Adolf Hitler regarded *The General* as an excellent study of the character of British military leadership and the book's German translation was on the Reich's recommended reading list. Such perverse popularity was probably embarrassing to the author, a super-loyal Briton who fought as an infantryman in World War I and did propaganda work in World War II. The book was allowed to run out of print and has not been available for the past five years, but a new edition has now been issued. The story of the rise of a flustered subaltern in the Boer War to the eminency of a lieutenant-generalship in World War I is three or four hours of pleasant reading to anyone. To the discerning military reader it is something more.

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This Month and Next

☛ In the back of this issue you will find something which has never been done before by the GAZETTE. It is a topical index of the magazine's contents for the year 1947 and we think it will prove a useful addition. Certainly it will make the 1947 GAZETTE much more useful as a reference.

☛ This issue marks the conclusion of the 31st volume of the GAZETTE. Next year will be its 32d year of publication. To start 1948 off right, our make-up has undergone a complete revamping. Beginning with the next issue, the GAZETTE will no longer be a "little" magazine. It will be a standard-sized magazine measuring eight and a half by eleven inches. This means greater readability, more text, more pictures, and—we hope—a generally more attractive magazine. But rest assured that the "new" GAZETTE will not be

all show and no substance. Our schedule for the next several months is the most interesting and informative that we have been able to list in a long, long time.

☛ In the January issue there will be *Control of Supporting Aircraft* by BRIGGEN VERNON E. MEGEE which gives not only the background of air support ground control but outlines a program for future training.

☛ *Top Goes Out on Thirty* by CAPT JOHN L. ZIMMERMAN is an unusual piece for the GAZETTE in that it deals with a personality, but in this case we think a deviation from policy is justified.

☛ *Attack Against a Fortified Beach* is a graphic presentation of how to take pillboxes by using the school solution. Demonstration troops involved are from the 22d Marines, Reinforced.



Target Eurasia and the Next War

from England, however, our relationships with the Old World have undergone a series of violent alterations and these alterations have changed Europe the base, Europe the protector, Europe the provider, into something it has remained without exception and with growing intensity through five separate wars; namely, Europe the target.

In the War of the Revolution our ability to impose our will on Target Europe was more or less confined to John Paul Jones' raids on the sea-lanes off the British Isles and to such forays as the Marines made on the British ammunition depot on Andros Island, in the Bahamas. Nevertheless, the defeat of England's armies in North America was a blow felt on the other side of the Atlantic. It served notice for the first time that other governments could no longer handle American affairs through their agents in London.

In the War of 1812 our privateers deployed in greater numbers over wider areas and we dropped the light noose of a Nelsonian naval blockade that was felt in many European ports dependent on British maritime transport. Thus

we applied a mild variety of pressure to all of Europe.

In the War with Spain our naval power had advanced to a point where we were able to break the will of a European nation in two separate theaters of war 10,000 miles apart—in the West Indies and in the Philippines. But it is doubtful if we would have taken on the Philippine adventure nearly 7,000 miles from our own West Coast if we had not been satisfied that two other formidable naval powers, Britain and Germany, would not interfere. In our defeat of Spain we helped to accelerate the decline of a major colonial empire whose headquarters was in Europe. This applied a profound pressure in the Eastern Hemisphere. It cleared the way for a

✻ FOR 171 YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS had to worry about Europe. Before 1776 the American pioneers, as British colonials, also had to worry about Europe but in those days the nature of the worry was in reverse direction to the flow of modern relief and Lend Lease. Would those rear echelon fatcats send enough food, wine, tools and weapons? Would they provide help in subduing the Indians? Could they be counted on to offer protection from the raids and invasions of other ambitious European powers? In fact, a spirited if not overwhelming case can be made out in support of the theory that we decided to cut loose from Mother England because she gave us less help than we figured we could furnish ourselves if we were once freed from the encumbrances of fief and fealty.

From the day we declared our independence

Maj Guy Richards

The traditional European balance of power has been shattered. Quite possibly we might someday be forced to fight against an enemy which dominates the entire Eurasian land mass. If this happens, what would be the role of amphibious warfare?

competitive playoff between Germany and England.

It was not until that Anglo-German playoff resulted in World War I that we had developed into an amphibious power capable of conducting—with the aid of strong allies—operations inside the perimeter of Target Europe, an ability which was again demonstrated and greatly extended in World War II. It is an irony of fate that our first invasion of Target Europe marked the beginning of Europe's dual and strangely contradictory roles as our habitual target and our habitual object of charity. Europe the target and Europe the economic rathole have registered rising graphs of importance in our overall war plans and our overall peace plans. It is really amazing that the following two questions should gain vogue at the same time in our history:

Will we have to fight all of Europe some day?

Will we have to feed all of Europe some day?

A third question follows mournfully but quite naturally: Will we have to do both at about the same time?

It is the purpose of this article to show how World War II has further altered our relationship with Europe; how these alterations must influence plans for averting or winning World War III; and what courses of action are indicated for the United States.

☛ FROM 1776 to the final months of World War II Target Europe presented many year-by-year consistencies which served to simplify the foreign and military policies of the United States. It included several strong land powers. It included several strong sea powers. For the last 15 years it included several strong—or potentially strong—air powers. The propinquity of these powers to each other and the likely priorities that each accorded to his neighbor as a possible target created the European balance of power in which few nations for very long gained a predominance that posed a menace to the United States. History tends to show that when any nation or group of nations did pose this menace we went to war against it and defeated it.

But in the last few months of World War II the traditional European balance of power was violently shattered. In the same few months Target Europe, as far as the United States is concerned, was converted into Target Eurasia. A single dominant nation without a serious military rival on the continents of Europe and Asia stretches all the way from Western Germany to the Kurile Islands, from the Arctic Ocean to the palm-studded shores of the Black Sea.

There is no land power in Europe or Asia capable of checkmating or defeating this nation's land power. There is no air power in Europe or Asia capable of winning round-the-clock mastery of the skies above all its vast territories and not the least of the reasons for this are the very vastness of those skies and territories. Whether or not there is a naval power in Europe or Asia capable of destroying Eurasia's canals and coastal trade routes and blocking all the continental ports is a question reserved for later treatment. The point is that land power is now more firmly established under one flag in Europe and Asia than if Napoleon and Genghis Khan had been able to join forces in time, space, and the full flush of victory. The balance of power in Eurasia has been succeeded by a power out of balance.

From this unprecedented state of European history comes the big questions which may have to be kept at the top of the list for a long time. They are:

1. To what extent could atomic weapons aid an anti-Eurasian combine in conquering Eurasia?

2. When atomic weapons are on both sides, and mutually employed or mutually rejected, what resources remain by which an anti-Eurasian combine could defeat the Eurasian combine?

I believe that the answer to the first question is of fleeting importance. It seems to be the obligation of our military planners to place little hope on the long-range benefits we are apt to derive from our initial monopoly in the use of nuclear fission as a war weapon. Because our monopoly may be short-lived, that alone is reason enough to put little reliance on it. But there are many other reasons for discounting it. There are few places in Europe today where an atom-

MAJ GUY RICHARDS, *well-known writer and traveller, has for years been a periodic contributor to the GAZETTE. A reserve major on active duty, Richards at present is at work on a comprehensive history of the Marine Corps Reserve. Concerning "Target Eurasia and the Next War," Maj Richards has this to say:*

"This is the outline, it seems to me, of the kind of war we would have to fight if we found ourselves embroiled with an Eurasian combine at any time within the next ten years or so. It would not be a push-button war. It would not be a war in which machines would do all the fighting and men simply manufacture and control weapons and communicate from one command post to another. And it would not be the kind of a war we fought against Germany, a war in which we took the time to breed, train and exercise another huge bull of an army capable of entering the arena and meeting the rampaging monster of the Wehrmacht in a frontal assault.

"The war we would have to fight is a tricky, two-way version of the war we fought against Japan. It is a kind of war in which we should be prepared to send against the ground forces of Eurasia, not another similar monster, but a crew of adroit matadors that would attract the onrushes of the Eurasian mammoth, weaken and bleed him as he thundered into well-baited enfilades, and, by side-steps and withdrawals, wear him down to the point where he is ready for the *coup de grace*.

"It is significant that the style of war here described calls neither for the abolition nor deemphasis of a single arm of the services that helped slug out our victories from 1942 to 1945. On the contrary, strategic and tactical air power; carrier aviation; naval rockets and naval gunfire; shorebased rockets and artillery; airborne, armored and infantry divisions; assault, construction and aviation engineers; signal battalions; antiaircraft batteries; attack transports and assault landing-craft—the whole gamut of naval and military arts that won the last war will most assuredly be the ones to win the next one if it comes

within the span of a decade or so. It is only inviting disaster to face away from these facts, to dote on dream-books and futuristic toys, to pretend that all the old rules are gone with the wind.

"Considering how we have allowed our air power to melt away since 1945, this writer is scarcely in the mood to chastise the aviators for their public dissertations during the past twelve months which seem to want to prophesy that the next war could be won in the air alone. The next war could certainly be lost in the air. But it could not be won in the air alone until numerous new weapons have passed from the drawing-board to tested use and volume production, and it is an open question whether any will ever be able to manage victory single-handed. Strategic air power will have increasing materiality until radar-controlled antiaircraft missiles make the sky untenable for anything slower than the speed of sound; but strategic air forces will not for years, if ever, nullify the indispensability of tactical air forces or the combat teams those forces are designed to support. And the ever-mounting ranges of the big bombers will never negate the lesson we learned when we put the B-29s that bombed Japan in the Marianas Islands. That lesson is, namely, that the best place to base a strategic air force is just outside the margin of the enemy's ability to retaliate—but not much further. For even though newer and larger bombers carry heavier loads for greater distances, it is obvious that they can carry more loads more often, and at a cheaper price in crew and machinery fatigue, if their missions require them to fly only a half or a third as far as they are able.

"This, then, is the key to any assault on Eurasia: Mobility, maneuverability and greater versatility for the land-sea-and-air combat teams that have become our national specialty. Not a bull to be pitted against a bull. And not a picador—safely elevated but poorly armed—pitted against a bull. And not a matador pitted against a picador or another matador.

"But a matador—as light in the air as he is on his feet—pitted against a bull."

bomb could be detonated without injury to thousands of French, Dutch, Italians, Greeks, Turks, Austrians, and other neutrals or potential allies. Furthermore, a few days of well-planned effort would enable Eurasia's preponderant ground forces to seize hundreds of American citizens, troops, seamen, and diplomatic personnel and redeploy them as hostages in many target areas all over Europe and Asia. Then dare the American Government to destroy its own nationals—if it chose—in an atomic attack.

The use of the hostage enjoyed a brilliant if not widely publicized revival in the last war. It seems to me a stratagem particularly favored by Oriental and Slavic mentalities. Probably its largest-scale employment was when the Japanese Marines dragged several thousand Filipino citizens into Intramuros, the old Spanish fort in Manila, early in 1945, and thus stymied for days the attempts of the 37th Infantry Division to make use of its air support, artillery, and heavy weapons. But the practice of kidnapping for political ransom has continued actively into the postwar period in China, Poland, Yugoslavia and Soviet-occupied Europe and Asia. The relatively high premium placed on human life by Americans suggests that we may see much more of the hostage before we see less. And as a deterrent to the atomic initiative of such a death-wary nation as the United States, particularly where American lives are at stake, the hostage is an unfortunately but peculiarly appropriate pressure device.

❖ THE ALL-AROUND RESULTS at Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Bikini have pretty well established the atomic bomb as a horror weapon in a class with the dreaded poisons like gas and bacteriological warfare, two media which were possessed by both sides during the last war and were unemployed by both sides because they posed the threat of mutual devastation.

The use of poisons on a large scale only serves to deprive the victor of his spoils. They lay waste the land he seeks to conquer. They transfer from the asset to the debit side of the ledger the wealth of a conquest that may very easily be the main reason for his assault.

Thus the advantages of our atomic monopoly may have lapsed already. Atomic weapons may already be impractical, inexpedient and impossible for any nation to use against another. Though our leaders are under compulsion to maintain their readiness in this field, indeed, to improve

their readiness by all known means of research and experiment, it seems to me that we must devote our most creative thought to the problem of winning wars without benefit of an atomic monopoly and probably without benefit of atomic weapons.

The first question then manages only to demonstrate the importance of the second question. Aside from atomic weapons, what are the resources by which an anti-Eurasian combine could hope to gain a decisive victory in Eurasia?

There are several interesting facts about Eurasia that comprise a helpful preamble to answering this question. Neither Europe nor Asia is entirely surrounded by water, for example, a fact which has profoundly influenced past wars. Yet Eurasia is entirely surrounded by water.

Eurasia's land area of 14,568,750 square miles is 4.82 times the 3,022,387 square miles inside the continental United States. Yet its coastline is eight times that of the United States. In other words, it is much more vulnerable than the United States to surprise attacks from the sea.


There is no longer a formidable naval power among the Eurasian nations connected by a common land boundary. The only remaining naval power of any consequence is England, an island nation. That means any nation or coalition of nations with a strong navy to which Britain's is not opposed, and with the ability to protect that navy with a dominant local air cover, could make a landing almost anywhere it chose on the perimeter of Eurasia.

To meet the challenge of such a landing, the defenders' deployments and supply-trains would have to depend on a rail and road network inferior to that in the United States, with the exception of a few parts of Western Europe; and which, on the Siberian approaches to the Far East, the Afghan approaches to India, and the Middle Eastern approaches to Persia and Africa, might easily be severed and blockaded by continuous bombings.

❖ AN ANALYSIS of these facts leads to several pertinent conclusions:

(a) That any redeployments of Eurasia's huge ground forces might prove embarrassingly slow for the defenders if the invaders picked their landing-sites with that embarrassment in mind.

(b) That great damage could be done to the defenders' ports, depots, plants, roads, and railroads before he was able to mobilize enough



THIS IS THE TARGET: EURASIA, THE WORLD'S GREATEST LAND MASS.

strength to contain or repulse the invaders.

(c) That the defenders' reinforcements could be punished heavily by the invaders' bombs, rockets, artillery, and naval gunfire support before they were able to close with the invaders.

(d) That redeployment of the invaders' forces by sea, via withdrawals and new surprise landings, might easily be made at a faster rate, and with an increasingly favorable gain in damage inflicted, than the defenders could cope with them.

(e) That there is a periphery of islands around the perimeter of Eurasia that stretches through the Arctic, the Baltic, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian and North Pacific Oceans. All these islands can be denied to the Eurasian combine and employed by the anti-Eurasian combine that possesses the necessary naval superiority, mobile air power and amphibious striking force. All of these islands can be turned into a part of the formula for defeating a huge land power that happens to be a weak naval power.

(f) That the antidote to the pattern of assault outlined from (a) to (e) is the construction by the Eurasian combine of a Navy and an air force able to cope with the invaders within a very short time after the assault landing and which are definitely able to turn any withdrawal by the invader into a costly disaster for ships and men. Such a navy, such an air force, are not now in existence.

(g) That in the absence of superior naval and air power by the defenders, and granting the ability of the invaders to bring withdrawal tactics to the same plane of efficiency that the United States has brought its landing tactics, an anti-Eurasian combine could sap the strength of Eurasia's ground forces on the perimeter of Eurasia. With the Periphery Islands as air bases and launching-sites for rockets and guided missiles, the invaders' amphibious combat teams could hit and withdraw in hundreds of places, destroying installations and communications, and wiping out piecemeal inferior detachments of the defenders' ground forces. This would be

an absolutely necessary preliminary to the final campaigns of decision, the invasion of the Eurasian heartland, the jumping from the Periphery Islands to the soft spots in the armor of a surrounded police state, and the separation of its leaders from its peoples. But it might prove by itself to be the final campaign of decision. So large an organism as a Eurasian State would be compelled to consolidate its strength and centralize its resources if it found its extremities being turned into dispersed scenes of havoc for its wealth and manpower. It would be forced to shorten its lines. It would be forced to pull out of many parts of Europe and Asia. It would cease automatically to be the Eurasian State and the minute it did it would cease to be the power out of balance in Eurasia and would have restored the possibilities for the return of the balance of power; for every nation it would have just evacuated would have been returned to the list of possible allies for the anti-Eurasian coalition. And when that occurred, the Periphery Islands offshore could be augmented by political islands inshore to carry the assault further and further.

❖ TWO KINDS OF ISLANDS must hold our attention as the nation best equipped to wage an island war. One kind is the Periphery Island. Its numbers are legion from the Bering Straits to Crete, from Ceylon to Japan. The other is a new kind of island that has been born to military science by the very mobile and complex performances of modern weapons. This island is the "Military Island." It can be defined as that section of the earth's surface, either land, water or a combination of both, which one combatant can turn into a form of disastrous encirclement for another combatant.

A drop of water is an island. A bubble of air is an island. Neither, however, are ever apt to be Military Islands. But a strip of water such as a lake can be a Military Island for any fighting force that can reach its shores but has no means of crossing it. A strip of land can be a Military Island for a naval detachment that can reach its coast but has no means of landing its fighting equipment and progressing further. These are deserts, swamps, mountains, and jungles that one force can turn into Military Islands for another. And there are also disgruntled peoples, slave states and occupied nations which form a sort of political island that deft manipulation can turn into a Military Island.

In the later stages of the Southern Mediterranean Campaign, North Africa became a Military Island for the Germans. With their air and sea transport cut off, and flanked by the desert on one side and the Mediterranean on the other, and facing enemy forces to the East and West, the *Afrika Korps* veterans found their final defeat in a true Military Island. The strategy of encirclement and destruction is far from being new; on the contrary, for hundreds of years it has haunted the operations plans of all kinds of soldiers and generals. But it has only been in recent years where the sky, the surf, the sand, the swamp, the ultra high frequency rays of radar and television, and even the upper atmosphere and the stratosphere, have become parts of the possible means by which one combatant might hope to build a Military Island for another. For it has only been in recent years when the sky could be a barrier for one combatant, but not another; where the mangrove, swamp, or jungle was an obstacle for Japanese heavy equipment, for example, but not for American supplies loaded on amtracks; where oceans posed a final dead end for the power of one nation while serving another as a broad avenue of approach for its land power and landing power, its planes, heavy weapons, industrial skill, and political influence.

The secret, then, of any successful assault on Eurasia lies in certain important improvements on the secrets of how we wrapped, packed, stowed on shipboard and discharged from shipboard the planes, men and weapons that won the war against Japan, Italy and Germany. The mobility of our total forces, the savagery of their striking power, and our resultant freedom to pick the places we want to fight, still describe, in this very year of extreme demobilization, our greatest military assets as a far-ranging global power. They are assets which make us most feared as a potential enemy. They are assets which make us most valued as a potential ally. They are assets which our native traits, our supporting industry and our mechanical flairs would be able to improve and exploit with relative ease, promising continuous advantage over other nations.

❖ IT SEEMS TO THIS WRITER that most important improvements we should undertake are in the ability to concentrate all forms of fire power on reinforcements the defenders are sure to send by air and by land to counterattack our landings; in our ability to conduct quick and wide-

spread sabotage operations on roads, railroads, airports, and all other facilities of possible use to the enemy; and in our ability to withdraw our landing forces with the same speed and finesse that we are now able to put them ashore. It is suggested that future maneuvers of combat teams be conducted with these improvements in mind.

In the course of improving those talents we should also be able to develop some new wrinkles such as a really fast and powerful amphibious tank: a tank that carries rockets, flame throwers, automatic weapons, and artillery, and that can get itself off and on a mother ship faster than our amtracks and DUKWs. Additionally, to expedite withdrawals, we should experiment further with glider pickups, helicopters, and submarines. A withdrawal needs a sizeable covering force and such a force must be able to make its getaway with even greater speed than the other components.

❁ PERFECTION in the art of amphibious withdrawals is mandatory for any plan to be a lethal Flying Dutchman for Eurasia's ground forces. I admit that this concept may be regarded at the outset as unorthodox and probably foolhardy, but I don't think it will be so regarded very long. If we can land when we want to and get away when we want to we can always fight under circumstances that are favorable to us. We can always grapple with that portion of Eurasia's armies that we can destroy piecemeal. But if we can't get away when we want to the shoe is on the other foot. We are the ones doomed to be surrounded. And since the defenders needn't fear our departure, only to reappear elsewhere, they can commit far more of their forces to wipe us out than they would dare to do if we could get away. On the other hand, if we can withdraw when we want to, all the seas and oceans around the perimeter of Eurasia can be converted to our own advantage into the same hopeless distances for the pursuer, and the same protective vastness for the pursued, that the great Central Eurasian Plains proved to be for Napoleon's and Hitler's armies. There would be an additional advantage for us. There is now no Eurasian naval power capable of pursuing us. Thus we could always pose the threat of landing soon again at a place of our choice.

It is one of the main theses of this piece to demonstrate that the strategy of withdrawal is bound to be the central idea of any campaign against a strong landpower waged by a nation

which is a pastmaster in the art of amphibious warfare and whose naval supremacy is virtually unchallenged by the defenders. Mobile and highly concentrated air power is one necessary accomplice to its success; so is the ability to make quick use of strategically adjoining island bases. As far as island bases are concerned, all we need to teach ourselves is how to get in and out of them faster than we did in World War II. It is in the conduct of amphibious withdrawals that we need to do a lot of new thinking and planning and rehearsing. In this new doctrine we must be ready to abide by an old one; namely, exploit success, be ready to abandon failure.

Points of objection to the thesis of amphibious withdrawals are apt to be these very logical questions: How can you win a war by withdrawals? Aren't wars won by the destruction of the enemy's fighting forces? Do you think you have some scheme by which withdrawals can destroy the enemy's forces?

❁ IN BOTH LAND WARFARE and amphibious warfare the planned withdrawal has played a significant, if slightly unpopular role, in nearly all the wars of history. It helped defeat Napoleon and it helped defeat Hitler, yet it was not the only factor that defeated either of them and it can be said that the morale of troops and their commanders who have carried out withdrawals has never been such as to popularize the art, to make other commanders practice it when they didn't have to. Yet when we pass from land warfare to amphibious warfare we find many inducements to use the withdrawal as a device against an enemy who can't move across water. Dunkirk was a withdrawal by which the presence of the sea was made to secure the escape of more than 300,000 British officers and men. They were forced to leave most of their equipment behind; but they returned to fight again and win. Dieppe was a raid and withdrawal which cannot be classed as a success. There was no preliminary air bombardment because the British Cabinet feared for the consequence if such a bombardment killed French civilians; partly for the same reason, and partly because the Admiralty didn't wish to risk a battleship within range of German coastal batteries, there was only slight naval gunfire support (cruiser and destroyer fire on call); and the German shore installations were far more formidable than air intelligence indicated. The American submarine raid on Makin Island

was a successful raid and withdrawal under skies dominated by Japanese aircraft. Almost all objectives were carried out by the Marine raiders, enemy installations wrecked, enemy troops killed or wounded. From all these amphibious withdrawals and from non-withdrawing assaults that were to come in North Africa, Tarawa, Guam, Saipan, Normandy, Iwo Jima, the Philippines, and Okinawa, lessons were learned about close air and naval gunfire support, the use of armored vehicles, chemical aids and supporting weapons which succeeded in winning far more heavily fortified beachheads than any we would have to choose on the present perimeter of Eurasia. Employed for a reverse purpose, and lacking only some elements of surprise, they could undoubtedly prove sufficient to cover an amphibious withdrawal.

☛ WITH REVERSE ENGLISH added to our bag of amphibious tricks, we could land on several Eurasian beachheads simultaneously. In quick, cavalry-like strikes led by armored columns, our combat teams could fan out on a five-way mission:

1. Find and destroy the defenders' local forces.
2. Find and destroy everything of value to the enemy.
3. Remain long enough to attract such reinforcements as the enemy can send from adjacent localities and which will provide targets of opportunity for own aircraft and our own forces.
4. Withdraw in face of unmistakable evidence that the enemy is massing superior forces.
5. Prepare for a new landing elsewhere.

Three major objections may be leveled at this scheme of operations, to wit:

1. What are our forces going to do if the enemy sends one, two, or even three airborne divisions to counterattack our invasion?
2. Aren't our troops going to get a progressively worse beating from the defenders' air forces, culminating in a near disaster on the day they reembark?
3. Aren't the ships waiting to reembark them going to be very vulnerable to attacks by air and submarine?

Answer to No. 1: The doctrine of any successful amphibious assault or amphibious withdrawal calls for local air superiority. With the aid of the Third Fleet's carrier planes, for example, we succeeded in the attaining this air superiority against fighters and bombers from more than

200 Japanese airfields in the Philippines even though our landing at Leyte was outside the range of all but a few long-range American bombers at Peleliu and Morotai. We could do it again and again. We will have to be able to do it again and again. Under the circumstances, it would be to our advantage if the defenders chose to put a division or two into the air. They would provide a juicy target for our fighter patrols and our new radar-controlled antiaircraft flak. Because of that fact it is doubtful if the defenders would risk a heavy investment of airborne troops in an area of our own choice, but if they did, and large numbers of troops escaped our aerial countermeasures, we should be ready to reinforce our own ground forces with our own airborne reserves.

Answer to No. 2: Control of the air is rarely 100 per cent airtight. Our troops will of course be subject to enemy air activity. But it must be recalled that our troops will be deployed in what is in reality enemy terrain. Air force commanders, where bomb lines are fluid, where friendly troops and friendly civilians are presumed to be in great numbers, are not likely to order many strafing or bombardment missions unless the targets are clearly hostile and clearly visible. Such opportunities will be infrequent.

Answer to No. 3: In the operations envisaged here the shipping should unload and stand out to sea. The mystery of the withdrawal rendezvous should remain complete for the enemy until the answer manifests itself. It might be the same beachhead as the landing. Better still, and far more likely, it would be a different one, a locality that makes allowances for the motion and direction of our columns ashore.

☛ I BELIEVE that the possibilities of this approach to the problems of assaulting Eurasia are bound to be alluring as long as we maintain our air, naval, and amphibious supremacy, as long as we keep our know-how for moving in and out of adjoining island bases, as long as we are willing to devote time and energy towards increasing the speed and fury of our landing and withdrawals. This, in short, is the design of the only power that can end the unbalance of power in Eurasia.

In early stages of assault we should try out this method in Eurasian terrain compartments where naval gunfire could continue to cover, along with our ground and naval air, our excursions ashore. Thus coastal areas in the Gulf

of Bosnia, the White Sea, France, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, the Crimea, and Kamchatka would offer excellent chances for turning adjoining areas into Military Islands for the enemy. The next step would be up to the 200-mile inland range which carrier aviation now possesses inside all the coasts of all the continents. Helgoland, the Balearic Islands, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, Crete, Cyprus, Japan, the Western Aleutians, would offer the advance island bases that our land-based aircraft would require in support. Later, as we slashed deeper into the rind of Eurasia's perimeter, and sliced larger pieces from the arteries of transport and communication, we might reasonably expect to find political islands in the heartland where we would be welcome and where the rallying manpower would enable us to stay without fear of being expelled. Disgruntled occupied nations and their political minorities are not the only underground we could expect to help us. Another might easily be some of the 13 to 17 million slave workers recently estimated to be hard at work under their masters in Central Eurasia.

What influence should the concept here described exert on the long-range military and foreign policies of the United States?

The possible future importance of Eurasia's Periphery Islands to the United States suggests that they could be a source of repayment if our present policies requires more and more re-financing of foreign rehabilitation. In other words, those islands contain acreage we should be willing to buy or lease. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Britain, Greece, Turkey, the new Indian states, and China are all in possession of terrain strips for which the American people would be willing to pay, I think, if they knew why they were valuable. The purchase of a base on the Island of Crete, for example, might well be worth the large sums of money we are pouring into Greece; an Italian site the money we are pouring into Italy; a Turkish site on the Black Sea the money we are pouring into Turkey. Diplomatic objections to such purchases might reach grave but not insuperable proportions. Many sovereign states have bought territory from others and in American history there are such precedents as the purchase of Alaska from Russia, the purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark, the lease of bases in Polynesia and New Caledonia from France, during the past war; the 99-year leases in Britain's Atlantic and


Caribbean islands; and the rental of an air base in Brazil.

However, the actual possession of sites in the Periphery Islands is not as essential to us as the power and mobility of our amphibious striking power which could enable us to take the islands we need when we need them. It will be seven years to a decade or more before rocket and guided missile programs have reached the stage where either have become an independent means for waging intercontinental war; but when these programs "come in," they will do so first at short ranges. The combatant who can seize sites off his intended victim's coasts will have an advantage that needs no further elaboration. Advance island bases may be regarded as overvulnerable to air attack. With the exception of the freak instance of Pantelleria, however, (much publicized and over-rated by the proponents of air power, for the Italian garrison had just about lost its will to resist) there have been no instances of an island base being captured or nullified by air power alone; and heavily-battered Malta, which held out from start to finish of the war, played a large part in the neutralization of German air and surface transport in the Mediterranean.

✿ BARRING the possibilities of acquiring sites in the Periphery Islands, there are near areas in Africa which we should keep our eyes on with the aid of friendly members of the United Nations. One is the upland belt the British are building for the defense of their empire in the Kenya-Tanganyika-Rhodesia Triangle, an area commanded air-wise and radar-wise by the snow-capped heights of 19,000-foot Mt Killimanjaro. Another is the one being constructed by the Belgian Government in the highlands of the Belgian Congo, near Lake Kivu. Both have access to two oceans via a chain of airfields which the United States helped to build during World War II. Both pose the capability of action on a broad sector of Southern Eurasia. Both provide—along with their respective coastal harbors—a refuge and a staging area, a defense in depth, a safe haven for the storage of supplies, an uncontained ability to move and strike in many directions, yet a reasonable proximity to two former continents which now, in the military sense, have become one.

This continent is, in fact, an island. The problem is to be able to turn it into a chain of Military Islands by using all the tricks of island war.

US ✿ MC



Base Plate McGurk . . .

More on Leadership

✱ I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT 90 PERCENT of the men who have reached general officer's rank during the last two hundred years have written either an article or a book on leadership. Now this is all very well since we all know that these gentlemen didn't make their ranks by sitting back and letting some other fellow show them the way. However, by putting their thoughts into the written word, they have inadvertently caused certain characters no end of trouble and grief. Briefly this trouble is: first, that none of them agree as to the relative importance of various leadership characteristics and second, that instead of coming right out at the beginning and stating that they don't agree with General So-and-So they make you read their entire publication to find out for yourself.

The reason that I am so familiar with this sad story is that I am now one of those characters who wish that the Generals would knock off writing about leadership. As a matter of fact, I wish they had never felt the urge to start writing about it. I was suddenly thrown into this situation when the old man got the idea (probably after reading an article) that one of his officers should work up a course on leadership for the battalion officers school. So he started picking one of us for the job. Joe Dodd was firing the range; Bill Smoaky, and Dusty were tied up on a not-guilty case—and so it went down the line. I was feeling pretty secure because I knew the old man figured I probably couldn't even spell leadership much less talk

about it when I noticed everyone, including the old man, was looking at me.

"McGurk," he said kindly, "I shouldn't pick you, because, among other things, I don't want to hear your pitiful tear-jerker about being the mess officer and how many men would probably get ulcers if you were not on the job every minute of the day. However, let's say that I'm going to pluck you for the job and, so that you'll have your days free to look after the mess, you can work on your leadership course at night."

Well, two nights and five beers later, I was working away in my room when I was visited by some of my so-called buddies. It seemed that they had just stopped laughing at my predicament and had dropped by with a case of beer to give me all the dope on this thing called leadership.

"It's really not so complicated," commented Bill Savage, "All you have to do is to know more about the military game than anyone else in your outfit. This applies to platoon commanders and right on up the ladder to corps and army commanders. Once you prove to those you are supposed to lead that you know your stuff, they'll follow you. But one thing for certain, you really have to know it cold because if you ever try to bluff, you are sure to be caught and after that you'll have a tough time convincing your men that you're not just a big noise."

"That's a pretty good point," drawled Smoaky, "but look at that pain-in-the-neck young Brass. He certainly knows his stuff cold. The trouble with him is that he has no tact. Furthermore, twice I've read him off for being partial to a couple of well known ear-bangers in his platoon and I have yet to see him take decisive action on any problem no matter how simple it may be."

Practical leadership will never be learned from books; however, an examination of the ideal leader reveals the following characteristics: knowledge, judgment, loyalty, acceptance of responsibility, humor, force energy, self-confidence, and self-respect



"No, Bill," Smoaky continued, "I don't think knowledge alone is what we want. I believe what you are talking about is judgment because good judgment requires knowledge and in addition it requires all of the things I've just said that young Brass lacks."

"I quite agree with you" Bill said, "and I feel that good judgment is a definite characteristic of good leadership. However, while you were talking another thought came to my mind. Besides good judgment I believe that a man must be willing to accept responsibilities. I have a couple of sergeants in my company who are damn near equal in judgment. Still one of them is miles ahead of the other because he seems to have more pride in his job or maybe it's more ambition—I don't know. As a matter of fact, maybe it's both because he is always doing what has to be done instead of waiting around to be told what to do. The other sergeant, once he has been told what to do, will turn in just as good a job but he has no initiative."

"And concerning officers," Bill continued, "we have all noticed the tendency in some officers to regard their work as merely the holding down of a job rather than the practicing of a profession. These characters are firmly convinced that all they are supposed to do for their salary is to put in the normal forty hour

week. Since we don't pay time and a half for overtime, they feel sorely put upon if it is necessary for them to work once in awhile at nights or on the weekend. Their ambition, if they have any, is not to be able to perform their duties in an outstanding manner but rather to be able to reach the highest rank possible with the least amount of effort. Any native initiative they might possess they stifle since if they allow it to express itself, it will simply mean more work for them. It's strange that none of them seem to realize that if they applied the effort they expend in avoiding responsibilities towards accepting and handling these responsibilities, they would soon find themselves outstanding officers. So, as I said, I would also list acceptance of responsibility as a prerequisite for good leadership."

"Well, it doesn't look so simple after all," Dusty commented. "Here we already have good judgment and acceptance of responsibility as two characteristics of a good leader. How about me adding a third?"

"Go ahead," grinned Bill, "but don't say that he has to be tall, dark, and handsome. We've already decided that that has nothing to do with it in the long run."

"If that is meant to be a slurring remark about my unusually handsome appearance, me lad, I am used to such cracks from lesser men and shall ignore it."

"My contribution concerns motivation. I learned that word while attending school at Quantico. To you, my unlettered knuckleheads, it means the ability to get someone to do something that you want him to do. Now don't laugh, Smoaky, because although a kick in the pants or a loud growl will definitely motivate, there are other and better ways."

"For instance?" I asked.

"Well, Base Plate," Dusty said, "for instance loyalty. If a man knows that you are loyal to him he will work his heart out for you. However, once he gets the idea that you are not looking out for him, he immediately feels that you are just using him and will not put out. Of course, this loyalty deal works up the ladder as well as down. And in this case, if a bird finds out that you are not loyal to those senior to you, he can rightly assume that you are not really loyal to those junior to you. I believe the descriptive phrase has something to do with 'one-way.'"

"Besides loyalty, there is humor and cheerfulness. No one likes to work for an old

pickle-puss' who always looks like he just tasted some of that Australian whiskey. You just notice, in an outfit that has a cheerful CO with a good sense of humor, all of the men will be happy and enjoying working for him. On the other hand, if the CO is one of those grim chin babies, the whole outfit walks around dejected and unenthusiastic. There are probably more ways of motivation but that's all I can think of right now."

"I've got one," I chimed in, "How about force? I don't mean the physical kind because I'll agree that there are better ways than a boot in the tail. In fact I've been telling my old man that from the time I was six. But a forceful man can sure as hell motivate. By forceful I mean a man who has the power to persuade or convince."

"Right, Base Plate," Dusty answered, "and that reminds me of another. Personal example is one of the most elemental ways of motivating someone else. The old saying 'Don't do as I do, do as I say' makes for a good laugh but it's dangerous in practice. If you walk around in a sloppy uniform, your men will soon be doing the same. If you are careless about saluting and other courtesies, your men will soon become just as careless. Furthermore, you can't blame them a damn bit for doing it."

"I guess that takes care of motivation and there's only one more characteristic that I would add," Bill said, "That is energy. Every recognized leader that I have ever seen or read

about was a hustler. They radiated enthusiasm and pep. I think that one of the main reasons an officer should keep himself in good physical shape is so that he will have the energy necessary to do his job properly. I've yet to see a booze hound or a glamor boy who went out every night to play with the girlyes qualify as a leader of men."

Smoaky had been awfully quiet just sitting there and taking it all in. At this point he stretched and casually dropped the prize thought of the evening.

"How about character?" he drawled.

We all looked rather perplexed and finally Bill asked him what he was driving at.

"Well," Smoaky said, "my pappy's favorite quotation was that one Napoleon got off when he said 'Men of principle are the principal men.' All my life I've been taught to judge a man not by how rich he is, or how smart he is, or how big he is, but by his character. If he's honest and fair and open-minded, you figure he's a pretty good man. If he has self-discipline you don't mind it if he disciplines you. If he has self-confidence, you feel like having confidence in him too. If he has self-respect, you'll find it easier for you to respect him. If he has determination and tenacity and fortitude, you'll know that he won't fold up in a pinch and let you down. Most of all, if he has courage, and I mean not only physical courage but also moral courage, you'll know that there is a real man who is worthy of being called a leader."

US MC





THE POSSIBILITIES OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS have been explored for a considerable period of time. A discussion of its possibilities, stimulated by the activities of the Russians and to some extent by Franco's early operations in the Iberian Peninsula, took place at one of the war colleges in 1937. Certain air enthusiasts contended that

Franco had moved an entire army from Africa into Spain by that means. This statement was countered by one who had intimate knowledge of the particular operation under discussion and who stated that some troops had been taken over from Africa into Spain by air, but that the bulk of the movement had been, as heretofore, in ships, both as to personnel and materiel. Since that time the development of aviation has made available types of airplanes capable of carrying considerably greater loads than those attempted at the time that this discussion took place. Furthermore, the production of these airplanes in quantity has rendered obsolete the limitations within which warfare was conducted at that time.

It is obvious that if Franco had possessed such an airforce as we possessed during World War II, the movement of his relatively small army from Africa into Spain could have been accomplished by air, with the possible exception of the heavy materiel, the transport of which still would remain to be made by ship. At the same time it would be well to consider that if Franco had possessed such over-whelming air power as to have given him complete control of the air plus sufficient transport planes for the movement of his troops, he would never have found himself in the precarious position he occupied during the early portions of his operations. Further-

more, in the breakthrough tactics which he employed he very probably would have used airborne troops in lieu of the Moroccan cavalry.

These speculations open up a vast field of conjecture which may project us far enough into the future to give us a fair guess about airborne operations short of the Buck Rogers era.

By MajGen Pedro del Valle

Again fitting the abstract into the actual operations of a past war, let us examine what might have happened at Pearl Harbor had Japan been equipped for an airborne invasion following her aerial bombing on that fateful 7th of December, 1941. Having established air control over the operating area, which in this case would have included all of the islands of the Hawaiian group and the surrounding seaways, the invaders would have dropped by parachute into certain areas under cover of the main attack and might even have employed airfields to crash land airborne troops as did the Germans in Norway. Amidst the confusion resulting from the destruction of communications, the coordination of the defense might have taken some time, and might have come too late to prevent the invaders from securing, if not the entire objective, at least a fairly secure foothold. The possession of planes now in existence would have made it possible for Japan to exploit the surprise of the defenders by pressing her advantage in a manner not practicable by any other means. It may be said that even a seaborne attack following the bombardment might have had a reasonable chance of success and that ships in possession of Japan were then available and could have been used. To this we shall have to reply that, had such an invasion by seaborne troops occurred, success could have attended it. And this brings us to the

es of Airborne Attack



point of examining and comparing the possibilities of the two methods of attack, namely, the seaborne and the airborne.

AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II historical military records contained but little to enlighten the student of the art of amphibious warfare. Yet, World War II was predominately a war of amphibious warfare, and in spite of the dearth of information and precedent, a fair body of tactical doctrine was evolved in time to be used successfully. Amphibious warfare as a means of imposing one's will upon the enemy is as firmly established today as any other form of warfare. Development of its techniques by the United States gave us a leading role and especially made the Pacific campaign possible. Some of its techniques are applicable to airborne warfare and some definitely are not. In a comparison between the two the ship of the sea reasserts its superiority over the ship of the air as a means of transporting bulk. On the other hand the ship of the air provides two points of superiority: one being the obvious one of speed, and the other being that of greater flexibility. In comparing ordinary land warfare with amphibious warfare it may be said that the strategical flexibility of amphibious warfare is greater and gives the attacker a much wider choice in selecting his point of attack. Similarly does the airborne attack excel the seaborne attack in strategical flexibility. The airborne attacker is not required to enter and land through surf and over

the reefs but may land practically anywhere, being limited only by certain considerations of terrain. Thus, the airborne attacker presents to the defender a much more puzzling problem than that which is presented by the amphibious attacker. If we take an example again from history and consider, say, the attack on Okinawa, we find that the defender was prepared to hold a southern portion of the island, leaving the northern portion, including several airfields, practically at the mercy of the invaders. The attacker on the other hand had decided upon a certain area for the landing attack due to the limitations imposed by navigational considerations, the terrain features, and the relative importance of objectives, among which airfields enjoyed a high priority. As far as the first phase of the attack was concerned, it is doubtful that an airborne attack would have materially shortened the period which it took for securing the central and northern portions of the islands.

The advantage of flexibility, however, could have been employed to air-land troops behind the prepared defenses of the Japanese, thus throwing them into considerable confusion and possibly shortening the campaign materially. As an example of what is meant, the capture of Kunishi Ridge may be cited. There the attackers, after searching for days for some means of finding a flank or getting to the rear of the enemy, without success, decided upon a night attack. The valley between our positions and Kunishi Ridge was dominated by Japanese fire from the left flank, where the army had not ad-

The last war saw airborne operations translated from theory to practice. We now possess sufficient experience and data upon which to base further conjecture about the probable future employment of the flexible "third-dimension" landing

vanced, and by a terrific concentration of small arms and mortar fire coming from the ridge itself, both from forward and reverse slopes. Any attempt to cross that valley even by such armor as we possessed was suicidal. Under cover of darkness, however, and taking advantage of the Japanese habits, portions of two battalions made their way across this deadly valley and secured positions upon the ridge without losing a single man. The reaction of the Japanese, indeed, did not set in until daylight. When it did it was furious, and the men on the ridge were in the difficult position of being isolated, as far as evacuation of the wounded. This same general scheme could have been employed by airborne troops in lieu of the night attack with the possible advantage of a wider choice of objectives. Perhaps a battalion, landed south of Kunishi Ridge, might have accomplished its early fall by the physical and moral effect of its presence in rear.

✿ IT IS POSSIBLE that a combination of sea-borne and airborne attack, properly coordinated, would be a practical tactical combination of some value. Thinking in terms of the limited land operations in support of the Navy, which is the principal role of the Marine Corps, let us explore this possibility. First of all, the heavy gear and the terrific tonnage of ammunition for an overseas operation still definitely must be carried by ships of the sea. Thus, the logistic support of the airborne as well as sea-borne operations falls ultimately to the Navy, which already has the material and technique for sea-borne operations of the kind under discussion. If we consider some such an operation, for instance, as the assault on the island of Guadalcanal, and try to visualize what a combined sea-borne and airborne attack would be like, we come to the immediate conclusion that a primary requirement for the airborne attack would be an airbase at a convenient distance and equipped with such supplies and equipment as can be provided by air. In this connection an operation such as that against Guadalcanal would have had to be predicated upon the possession of such a base, as well as the possession of air superiority over the area under dispute. However, conceding that we have both these indispensable requirements and proceeding with the assault on the target by both sea-borne and airborne attacks, it is difficult to visualize any substantial advantage of one means over the other in the circumstances.

However, if an airborne battalion had been

dropped on the grassy height known as Mt Austin, it would have helped enormously. In the first place it would have saved the 1st Marines a heartbreaking trek through the jungle toward an objective which was not within their reach. In the second place it would have given us possession of the commanding ground at the outset and would have demoralized the enemy further by the mere possession of that ground. Then, too, it would have simplified the task of the sea-borne attackers whose objective, the airfield, would have required no more than an advance over the beach trail. Another advantage would have been the denial of that area to the enemy for artillery observation and an obstacle in the path of his maneuvers into position for the Bloody Ridge and Matanikau battles.

✿ CONSIDERING such operations as Tarawa, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima, where an essential objective had to be seized regardless of the known existence of a powerful defense, it is difficult to visualize how an airborne attack would have been possible. Supposing, however, that at Tarawa the air and sea fire preparation had caused the enemy a temporary paralysis. Would it have been possible in the short period of neutralization to drop sufficient troops by parachute to secure a foothold?

Two factors lead one to believe it could have been done. We *did* secure a foothold in a sea-borne attack which was ill equipped, and with an inadequate sea and air fire preparation. We did not then possess amphibian vehicles in adequate numbers, and the men had to wade into the objective afoot. The sea and air fire preparation was not comparable to that provided at Guam, and the nature of the enemy defenses rendered their neutralization difficult. The period of paralysis was short.

After a careful and prolonged preparation, such as Adm Connolly put down on Guam, it is conceivable that sufficient troops could have been landed by parachute to: (1) Seize a foothold; and (2) Confuse and demoralize the defenders long enough to enable the sea-borne attack to get to the objective with minimum loss.

Against this we have the difficulties encountered in dropping troops accurately on such a small target and the relative slowness of the descent of the parachutes. Of these factors an alert enemy could have made good use. Thus, we could have lost some by drowning and some by enemy fire before they could land. Since, in the future, the defense will be expecting an air-

borne assault, we may be certain he will have observers to report and gunners to shoot them. Cover of darkness might have been employed, but at the risk of greater losses by drowning and greater difficulty in forming a cohesive force after landing. On the whole it would appear that the seaborne assault, if properly supported by sea and air fires, properly equipped for reaching the objective in a reasonably short time and properly deployed would still be preferable to the airborne attack for targets of this nature. Nevertheless, air transport for logistic support could be of great value.

☛ IN OPERATIONS of broader scope, such as the landings on France and Italy, the possibilities of the airborne attack appear to be limited only by the load-carrying ability of the available airplanes. The defender will be hard put, no matter how well organized, to take care of all the localities which offer practical advantage as targets to the attacker. Drawing an arc, with the maximum effective range of the troop carriers as a radius, and with its center at the base, we might have included a huge section of France or Italy in the scope of the airborne attack. Obviously, the best a defender can do is: (1) Cover all the ground involved with observation; and (2) Hold a highly mobile force, centrally located, to rush to the scene of the invasion. If the airborne attack is coordinated with a seaborne one, then we have the defender in the position of trying to guess which one we intend to push home. This paralyzes his reserves until he can decide. Meanwhile, one or the other attack will be the more successful. If the attacker has the means to employ this flexibility, he will exploit the attack which holds the best chance of success. By the time the defender commits his reserve it may be too late for an effective defense.

The foregoing, of course, is predicated upon effective sea and air superiority in the theatre and on the limitations of time and space. In addition, the two assaults must be in such juxtaposition that they have a definite relation to one another. Otherwise a future Napoleon will destroy each in turn. If the pressure exerted by one has no effect on the situation of the other the over all deployment is at fault.

Similarly, if we delivered two airborne attacks they would have to be integrated with the seaborne and with each other. At this time it still would appear unprofitable to limit ourselves to airborne assaults alone. Such logistic support as

is practicable by air cannot suffice for a major operation. The defender could move forces into the area to cope with the attack more expeditiously than the attacker could build up overwhelming power by air means alone.

It is possible that future developments may alter this conclusion. A large scale assault entirely by air, following a fire preparation entirely by air and supported logistically by the same means may some day in certain circumstances be practicable. As things now stand, without discounting the value of the airborne assaults, we must think of it only in connection with its older sister, the seaborne assault.

☛ NEVERTHELESS, alert military people must be thinking constantly of the practical possibilities presented by this type of warfare. Certainly the Marine Corps should be prepared at all times in training and equipment to deliver airborne assaults. Not only the future possibilities demand this but the exploitation of the present ones as well. For while a large-scale assault entirely by airborne troops may not yet be a practical possibility, small-scale assaults for specific purposes certainly are. Furthermore, it appears as though the airborne assault is at its best in combination with our own specialty—the seaborne attack. And as for small wars, we may look forward to initial movement into future small-war areas by air rather than by sea, even if eventually supported by the latter. In situations like that which resulted from Sandino's attack on Ocotal, the relief of our tiny garrison by airborne forces flown from Managua would have had enormous influence on the entire campaign.

In summing up, the writer reaches the following conclusions:

(a) Large scale airborne attacks unsupported by seaborne attacks are not at present likely to succeed against an alert and powerful enemy.

(b) In combination with seaborne or land attacks the airborne attack has gained a definite place in our tactical curriculum.

(c) For assaults on a limited scale, the airborne assault offers tremendous possibilities. (In small wars and in guerilla or sabotage tactics against specific objectives).

(d) The limitations imposed by capacity of present types may in time lead to a reversal of conclusion stated in (a).

(e) All ground troops should, by training and equipment, be prepared to be used as airborne troops.

US ☛ MC

Why A TQM?

✻ I'M NO LONGER STARTLED WHEN I HEAR THE question, "What in the hell is a TQM?" At first this grated on my nerves like, "What's a marine?", but now I merely go into a song and dance explaining what TQMs are and what their duties consist of.

No wonder there is some question about what "TQM" stands for because it certainly seems to be a misnomer. The letters TQM stand for *transport quartermaster* which doesn't really mean a thing. There's already too little understanding of what a plain ordinary quartermaster is. The term transport quartermaster just adds to the confusion. Several new titles have been suggested, such as ship or transport loading officer, but this does not entirely fill the bill. Anyone can commercially load a ship merely by filling up all available cargo space, but the TQM's job is slightly more complicated. Besides TQMs may have to load cargo and troop carriers other than ships or transports, such as freight cars, gliders, and the proposed "flying LST." "Combat Loading Officer" seems like a good title, but I'm not going to carry the banner because the term TQM has become pretty well rooted into our military terminology, and rather than further confuse the issue, let's just learn and use the term TQM. At any rate your TQM is not a quartermaster as commonly referred to, nor is he responsible or accountable for property or supplies brought aboard the transport.

Some people seem to believe that amphibious operations are outdated and that troop units will be moved by air from now on, therefore TQMs are outdated. It is true that some troop units will be moved by air, but TQMs will still have to combat load them. Trans-Ron 12 carrying the 6th Marine Division to Okinawa discharged 52,924 tons of cargo in nine days. It will be a long time before we are ready to transport such a weight by air.

Before wandering on into types and supposed duties of the TQM, it might be well to expound a bit on what we mean by "combat loading."

Asking several officers their conception of combat loading, the better answers were; "not putting all your eggs in one basket"; "loading on a last on, first off, basis"; "loading so your troops can come off the ship prepared and equipped to fight." These are all good answers and are essentially correct. We certainly don't want to put all our "eggs in one basket," so consequently it stands to reason supplies and equipment are distributed throughout the con-

voy so that the loss of one ship will not affect the fighting capabilities of the remaining units in the convoy. An example where this was *not* done was in the British invasion of Norway in the recent war (even after the loading lessons supposedly learned at Gallipoli). When the Germans finally forced the British from Norway, they found hundreds of brand new AA guns lined up on the beach which had never fired a round. Reason: the ammunition ship was sunk.

Not only do you find your convoy combat loaded, but each ship within the convoy is so loaded. Here are the three main factors which differentiate combat loading from other types of loading:

The first factor is *logistical self-sufficiency*. The tactical unit aboard each ship must have with them enough weapons, ammunition, fuel, water, rations, vehicles, and so forth to be initially self-sufficient as a fighting team.

The second factor is *tactical requirements*. Equipment and supplies must come off the ship in the correct sequence to provide troops from that ship with its material when and as it is needed. Remember that the manner in which the supplies and equipment are loaded aboard ship will determine the sequence in which they are unloaded.

The third item of importance is *speed*. TQMs must know how to load for rapid unloading. As a rule the Navy is most anxious to get those "sitting ducks" out of the target area, but the main reason for speed in unloading is to get your vital supplies and equipment ashore. It

By Maj Quintin A. Bradley

is during this early phase of the landing that the beachhead is most vulnerable to counterattack.

A very common question is "how long does it take to unload a transport?" Most TQMs will come up with a quick answer, but in reality it has about as many answers as would "how long does it take to take a walk." Unloading times are dependent upon the training of the troops and ship's crew, amount and type of cargo carried, distance from the ship to the beach, size and number of landing craft available, weather and surf conditions, and perhaps the greatest limiting factor, the speed and ability of the shore party to handle the equipment as it hits the beach.

Several years ago TQM schools taught that transports should be loaded so that they could be unloaded in four hours. This would have been fine if there was always adequate shipping, but this seldom, if ever, was true. Consequently, the greater the use of the cargo space available the longer the time of unloading. The average unloading time for the ships of TransRon 12 (6th Marine Division) at Okinawa was about 20 hours.

Perhaps the last two paragraphs seem a bit misleading in that I have seemingly minimized the essential factor of speed. With our overwhelming superiority in the air and sea in the majority of operations in the last war, speed may have been the least important of these factors in combat loading, but the importance of speed may be greatly accentuated in future amphibious operations.

☛ TQMs MAY BE DIVIDED into three groups: the ship TQMs, the troop TQMs, and the staff TQMs.

First to be considered are the ship TQMs. This group was a wartime improvisation and they proved themselves invaluable. In the early stages of World War II, some amphibious commands assigned TQMs from TQM "pools" to ships on a semi-permanent basis. About the time this assigned TQM learned his duties, and knew his ship's crew and the ship's capabilities, the transport left that particular theater, and the TQM was jerked back into the pool.

After a great deal of experimenting, and and through the general process of evolution, they finally arrived at the procedure which is in practice today: the ship TQM was a regularly assigned billet aboard APAs and AKAs.

This was fine during the war when APAs and AKAs were making one combat load right after another. TQMs were kept extremely busy. But times have changed. The Marine Corps is still assigning TQMs to APAs and AKAs, but how many combat loads do they make a year? About three or four landing exercises which in reality means about three or four weeks of actual, concentrated TQM work. Consequently, skippers have assigned these marines additional duties, such as gunnery officer, mess officer, legal officer, transportation officer, deck officer, debarkation officer, and a host of other jobs which have present day ship TQMs crying in their beer.

Several ship TQMs have suggested that the Marine Corps return to the old TQM pool system and just assign TQMs to ships involved in specific landing exercises. I think that would be defeating the purpose of the ship TQM because he would be as much of a stranger to the ship as would be the troop TQM. Keeping TQMs aboard ship acts as a two-way educational device. Not only does the TQM learn his job, but he keeps the Navy abreast and aware of TQM work. From an abstract sense, it is a good thing to have a marine aboard each APA and AKA, if for no other reason than to remind them that troops are also involved in amphibious operations. The actual duties of a ship TQM can be found listed in Phib 15, USF 63, or practically any publication on amphibious operations, but here, in general terms, is what the ship TQM must know and do:

First and foremost—he must know his ship from stem to stern. It wasn't long ago a ship TQM was asked some minor questions on a certain hold and he stated he'd never been in that particular hold, but then again he'd only been aboard ship six months, so he couldn't answer the question. It would be advisable if each ship's captain would have a TQM just reporting in, prepare a new ship's loading characteristics pamphlet as his first task. This would

The Transport Quartermaster is an anomalous creature. The Navy regards him as distinctly Marine; marines are apt to regard him as suspiciously Navy. Actually he has a well-defined role to play in the projection of an amphibious operation




What happens when rough weather hits a jeep improperly secured in a ship's hold.

be one way of assuring that the TQM became acquainted with the ship. The ship's loading characteristics pamphlet shows scale drawings of all the cargo holds, gives size of hatch openings, overhead clearance in holds, boom capacities, billeting spaces and all other detailed information affecting troops and cargo stowage. It is a prescribed duty that the TQM will assist the troop TQM in the preparation of the loading plans. A smart TQM will render this assistance by rapidly and correctly answering questions about his ship and the captain's likes and dislikes in loading.

There are dozens of important little jobs that

How not to load: Toss in beer, boxes, and radios; cover carelessly with heavy pipe.



ship TQMs must oversee as being sure that his ship is ready to load at the designated hour by having booms rigged, hatches open, and winch crews on the job; making sure that his landing craft are properly loaded, that cargo tickets are prepared, that loading and unloading studies are kept, that liaison is maintained, and so on.

Because a TQM receives little in the way of command experience and rapidly loses contact with the Marine Corps it is my opinion that a tour of duty of this nature should be limited to 18 months.

Before we leave the ship TQM sleeping soundly in his comfortable bunk, I have just one word of advice to anyone who may be or may become a ship TQM. Don't forget you're there to help the troops! You may be slightly indisposed while troops are aboard, but your job is to do everything possible to help get them embarked and billeted. Smooth over any cause for friction, and go out of your way to be agreeable. You're one of the greatest potential contributors to a happy ship.

✿ NEXT TO BE CONSIDERED is the troop TQM, BLT TQM, Honest-to-God TQM, or whatever you wish to call the individual who prepares the loading plans and loads and unloads a single ship.

Each battalion, battery, or separate unit should have at least one officer and several enlisted men trained as TQMs. The TQM should not be the unit's quartermaster, but an officer who can be relieved of all duties during the planning, loading, and unloading phases of the operation. There was a long period of time when battalion commanders picked out their "eight balls" for this job, but after the embarrassment of confused embarkations, the word began to get around that there was more to this loading business than appeared on the surface. Before the end of the war, most Marine units were assigning their best men to this job. There's nothing quite so easily and quickly fouled up as a combat load. While TQMs are charged with formulating the loading plans, it must be remembered that the troop commander is still the responsible party and he should certainly make a careful check of the plans. It is understood that often the pressure is on and speed is essential, but the preparation of accurate loading plans are days' work, not hours. Troop commanders must keep their TQMs informed and should get their loading plans started at the first possible moment.

In recent maneuvers with one division, some troop commanders ok'ed and signed the plans, yet prime movers were separated by hatches from their weapons, the ship was so loaded that low priority vehicles had to be unloaded first, and some other obvious errors. There's more to this business than just getting all supplies and equipment aboard ship. It is a matter for trained experts and, fortunately, TQM schools at TTU, San Diego, and TTU, Little Creek, are doing a thriving business. Here are a few of the things that will keep the troop TQM occupied from the beginning of the loading until the completion of the unloading:

He prepares the loading plans, acts as a liaison officer, assists or supervises the billeting and messing plans, organizes the ship platoon and working parties, supervises staging of vehicles and cargo at the dockside or beach areas, arranges for the advance detail to board, supervises the loading, and sees that stowage plans are being carried out, *ad infinitum*. The details of how TQMs go about preparing their loading plans and the data on loading forms will be skipped here. They take about a three week course of study, although you can get most of the basic concepts from some of our up-to-date publications. I will, though, try to set forth very briefly and in a paragraph or so, the procedure which has caused many a bad fitness report and much loss of sleep and hair.

There are three general factors confronting the TQM before he starts his loading plans. They are:

- (1) What and how much space is available aboard ship for troop cargo?
- (2) What cargo is to go aboard ship?
- (3) In what priority will each item of equipment be required on the beach? The first item isn't much of a problem to the TQM, as he gets this information from the ship's loading characteristics pamphlet (obtained from Division, TransRon, or ship files). The second item of information desired is submitted to him on one of the embarkation forms (unit personnel and tonnage table) by each separate organization to be embarked. The third item of information desired is merely the debarkation priority list which is prepared by CO of troops. On this list he coordinates his logistical support with his tactical plan.

The TQM now has the information as to what space is available, what equipment is to be loaded, and in what priority it must be un-



Marines from the 2d Division undergo TQM schooling before loading out for maneuvers.

loaded. Now the problem is where to put this equipment so that it can be unloaded according to priority. The TQM prepares a template for each vehicle cut to the same scale as his hold drawings from the loading pamphlet. Then he juggles and places each template around in the hold space so that each can be unloaded according to its assigned priority. Simple as working a jig-saw puzzle except that the ship should be so loaded that all holds can complete unloading at approximately the same time. There are several other little items which help to complicate the problem, such as boom capacities, size of hatch openings, overhead clearances in the holds, and so on. There's a great deal of paper work involved in preparing loading plans, but it is felt that this is one place where paper work pays off. Accurate paper work means accurate loading.

After the TQM completes his loading plans, and they have been approved by the CO of troops and the ship's captain, he can practically gear himself for the inevitable changes. The colonel has changed his mind and won't need his jeep until D plus 3, or Company A has forgotten to include a vehicle, and division wants to load 1000 cases of beer. If everyone understood that even a small last-minute change may cause a great deal of grief and considerable revision of the plans, perhaps fewer changes would be made.

Not long ago an officer asked me, "Once loading plans have been made, why can't they be used over and over again?"

This isn't such an illogical question, because BLT supplies and equipment will perhaps remain fairly stable. The reason this can't be done is because priorities will vary with each separate mission. Another factor is that ships, even though of the same class, will vary to a certain extent, and you will seldom use the same ship twice. Therefore, each lift must be separately planned.

The preparation of the loading plans which we have just skimmed over is the troop TQM's biggest job, but there are several other duties that should at least be mentioned. One of these is his liaison work. According to doctrine, the troop TQM carries on liaison through the ship TQM. But what usually happens? The ship comes in, and everybody and his dog goes aboard and in the confusion little is accomplished. We should have conferences, yes, unorganized liaison, no. Best to stick to the procedure of having the TQM carry out the bulk of the liaison work. He has to be in continual contact with the ship anyway. At any rate, good liaison work will not only receive and pass "the word", but will smooth out many of the snarls, misunderstandings, and hot situations.

Other duties such as establishing traffic control to pier or beach area, preparing and marking vehicles for loading, chocking and securing vehicles in holds, loading HE ammunition, keeping interested parties informed on the status of loading or unloading, seeing that landing craft are properly loaded, and numerous other duties are all good reasons why the troop TQM needs both sympathy and assistance.

☛ DIVISIONS, CORPS, AND FMF FORCES as well as naval amphibious staffs such as TransDivs, TransRons, Groups, and Forces have staff TQMs. The staff TQMs on naval staffs are Marine officers assigned to this duty by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the same manner as are the ship TQMs. In troop units the staff TQM is a special staff officer, usually assigned to this duty by the unit commander.

In addition to the normal duties of any special staff officer, staff TQMs usually act in a supervisory capacity and make recommendations on shipping allocations, maintain files of ship's characteristic pamphlets, and coordinate the loading of subordinate units. Staff TQMs may

assume the responsibility of conducting schools for TQMs from subordinate units. To me this seems to be just about the most important job the staff TQM could have, yet all too often this function is overlooked entirely. In one division (post-war era) practically the only training that was offered subordinate TQMs was the passing out of a woefully outdated mimeographed pamphlet right before a landing exercise. If the division staff TQM had been able to hold adequate schooling, many errors could have been eliminated and much time and energy saved.

Another little job the troop staff TQM can do that will save time in the long run is to keep an up-to-date list of vehicles and equipment in each subordinate unit. When the time arises and he has an operation on hand, he doesn't have to wait several days getting this information before he can begin his shipping allocation plans, but can sit right down and get to work. This information isn't particularly hard to get because each subordinate unit already knows what equipment it has on hand, yet how many staff TQMs have this information on hand today?

☛ TO THE TROOP OFFICER coming aboard after days of combat, the naval staff TQM's job looks soft—good food, hot or cold showers, good bunk and so on. Well, it is soft. At the target area his main job consists of keeping track of unloading percentages for all ships, assigning excess landing ships and craft to certain APAs or AKAs expediting the unloading, and worrying about keeping accurate figures for the action reports. As soon as the ships are unloaded, your naval staff TQM is off to the base of the next unit to be lifted to help out with liaison, assignment of shipping, and preliminary loading plans.

Well, there you have a very brief picture of TQMs and some of their problems. Practically every officer and man in the Corps will at some time have dealings with the TQMs, whether he is stowing cargo in the hold of some ship or commanding a division, so it is essential that all hands know the various types and duties of TQMs. It must be realized that combat loading is as important as any other cog in the wheel of an amphibious operation. Combat loading is really part of the tactics of the operation. In short, it means drawing up the first battle line of the invading forces aboard the assault ships before they leave the port of embarkation.

US MC

Recruiting— First Service of the Corps

IN 1775 ROBERT MULLAN, PROPRIETOR OF Tun Tavern, began the recruiting for the original two battalions of marines by promising ample grog rations, pensions, bounties, and prize money. The Marine recruiting service has long since lost that barroom air, but the principle of confronting the prospective recruit with both tangible and intangible incentives to enlist remains unchanged.

With the ending of World War II it was first thought that sufficient marines would reenlist to maintain the authorized 100,000 man post-war Corps. It was soon apparent that this assumption was wrong. A recruiting effort far greater than any before was definitely needed to fill the demobilized gaps in the ranks.

On 18 March 1946 a general officer was assigned duty as Officer in Charge, Division of Recruiting, and the title was immediately changed to Director of Recruiting, Marine Corps. That assignment marked the first time in the history of the Marine Corps that an officer above field rank was directly charged with the recruiting service.

Recruiters were made to know that theirs was one of the most important jobs in the Marine Corps. How well they reacted is shown by the fact that 51,755 marines (more than half of the Corps' present strength) was recruited in the nine months preceding October 1946. Since that month recruiting has slowed—16,445 enlistments figured to 31 July 1947.

In the opinion of several well-qualified recruiters, the enlistment deceleration which start-

The recruiters' immodest claim that theirs is the most vital branch of the Corps is supported by their record: In spite of postwar demobilization difficulties the Marine Corps has maintained its strength close to the authorized level

U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING SERVICE.

Wanted, for the United States Marine Corps,

Able-bodied MEN between the ages of 18 and 40 years, not less than 5 feet 8 inches high, and of good character.

SOLDIERS serving in this Corps perform duty at Navy Yards and on board United States Ships of War on Foreign Stations, which affords a splendid opportunity to travel and see the world.

The term of service is FOUR YEARS, and if a soldier reenlists at the expiration of that time, his pay will be increased two dollars per month for the first reenlistment, with a further addition of one dollar per month for all subsequent reenlistments.

By good conduct and attention to duty, a soldier will certainly rise to the position of a non-commissioned officer.

SERGEANTS in the Marine Corps frequently have independent command of guards on Ships of War and always on Gunboats. The following is the rate of pay as now established:

GRADE.	PAY OF UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.		
	Pay per Month.	Pay per Season.	Pay for Year.
To the First or Orderly Sergeant of a Company or Guard.	\$24 00	\$288 00	\$1,152 00
All other Sergeants, each.	20 00	240 00	960 00
Corporals.	18 00	216 00	864 00
Musicians.	16 00	192 00	768 00
Privates.	16 00	192 00	768 00
At Sea, the extra pay is	1 00	12 00	72 00

In addition to the pay as above stated, one ration per day and an abundant supply of the best clothing is allowed to every soldier. A soldier who is careful of his clothing can save during his enlistment from 50 to 80 dollars. Quarters, food, and medical attendance are always provided by the Government, without deduction from the soldier's pay. If a soldier should become disabled in the line of his duties, the law provides for him a Pension.

All other information which may be desired, will be given at the Rendezvous.

LIEUT. H. C. COCHRANE,

Recruiting Officer.

RECRUITING RENDEZVOUS.

FARNER'S BUILDING, CHICAGO.

May, 1906.

ed in October 1946, resulted from:

(1) Discontinuing, on 1 September 1946, the policy of granting recruits 10-day leaves upon completion of phase one training,

(2) Abolition of aviation duty only and two-year enlistments in October 1946,

(3) Removal of the guarantee for full enlistment GI Bill of Rights benefits for men enlisting subsequent to 5 October 1946.

(4) Effecting on January 1947, a policy limiting to private first class the reenlistment reappointment of former officers whose active duty status had been terminated more than 90 days and enlisted men who had been discharged for more than 30 days, and

(5) The draft holiday commencing in 1946,

By Capt Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr.

and final termination of Selective Service in March 1947.

From the Marine Corps point of view, the situation resulting from abolishing the foregoing incentives was aggravated by the fact that the U. S. Army continued to offer many of these inducements plus others, thereby securing some first enlistments and many reenlistments which would otherwise have gone to the Marine Corps.

❖ AFTER A STUDY of the recruiting problem, certain of the inducements were restored. In May 1947, the policy of granting recruits ten days leave upon completion of phase one recruit training was reinstated. On 22 July 1947, consent of parents or guardian was waived for all enlistees except 17-year-olds.

Reenlistment advantages were increased at the same time. The new policy permits men with dependents to reenlist without reference to Headquarters, Marine Corps, provided they are authorized reappointment to a rank in the first four pay grades. Men who held a rank in the second pay grade, or below, are appointed in their former ranks if they reenlist within 90 days (first pay grade men to be reappointed to their former ranks must reenlist within 30 days of discharge).

These changes made the recruiting outlook brighter for the few short days before 25 July 1947, when all GI Bill of Rights benefits were denied men enlisting after that date. The accumulated changes left the Recruiting Service with little more than its most reliable selling points: Travel, Education, and Adventure.*

The task of keeping the Marine Corps recruited up to strength was made to seem less formidable by the surprising fact that immediately after the war a large percentage of enlistees signed up for three- or four-year enlistments even though they could have successfully evaded the draft by choosing the short enlistment of two years that was authorized in December 1945. During the first three months after inauguration of two-year cruises more than 50 per cent of first enlistments accepted in the district of Jacksonville, Fla., for example, passed the short enlistment by to ship in for three or four years. That tendency waned, however, and the 1946 campaign resulted in a Marine Corps with more than half its strength composed of

men serving on enlistments that would expire in 1948—with a majority being two-year enlistments begun during the period 1 January to 30 September 1946. By successfully accomplishing 1946 recruiting goals, the Recruiting Service had created for itself another dilemma. The prospect of a Corps depleted by a 50 per cent turnover in one year necessitated a second campaign. This time it was to extend as many of the short enlistments as possible into a year subsequent to 1948.

To conduct the enlistment extension program which started in December 1946, the Recruiting Service began taking an active part in post and station recruiting. Under general supervision of the Division of Recruiting, one officer at each post and station was designated post recruiting officer and charged with planning a campaign to extend as many enlistments as possible. Liaison was established with the regular recruiting organization and the operation was successfully conducted. The most effective incentive for extending was the offer of an overseas station of the extendee's choice.

The Marine Corps Recruiting Service, by enlisting enough marines to fill vacancies created by demobilization and by assisting in extending the enlistments of many of the short-termers it had signed up, has thus far successfully met the initial postwar recruiting problem. To accomplish what it has, the Recruiting Service found it necessary to more than double the strength of 837 men and officers it had at the war's end. The peak strength of the Recruiting Service was reached on 1 June 1946, with an unprecedented total of 1,698 recruiters (159 officers and 1,539 enlisted). That would have undoubtedly shocked Robert Mullan when he was the only recruiting officer at a time when there were no recruiting sergeants.

To take that number of recruiters into the field corresponding large numbers of vehicles have been employed. The 4 x 4 1-ton cargo vehicles (weapon carriers) the Recruiting Service was saddled with shortly after the close of the war were replaced with a larger number of station wagons, pick-up trucks, and jeeps.

As part of the improved system, a streamlined administrative policy took effect in April 1946. It managed to find—and abolish—a number of reports and procedures that were not essential to profitable recruiting.

❖ OF COURSE, as in most enterprises, personnel was of prime importance and the selection

*A recent poll of 115 Southeastern Division recruiters placed "education through courses of the Marine Corps Institute," "opportunity to travel to foreign countries," and "opportunity to wear uniform and be part of a famous organization" in that order as the most valuable of eight recruiting incentives offered by the Marine Corps.



Recruiters depend largely on exhibits, public appearances, and radio to arouse a prospect's initial interest; these also help to foster a favorable public attitude.

of outstanding enlisted and commissioned recruiters was undertaken. The result has been a corps of recruiters composed almost entirely of veterans of extensive combat, about 75 per cent of whom had been wounded in action. Naturally, combat experience alone is not sufficient qualification for a recruiter but combat veterans were needed to relieve the many enlisted recruiters who, for one reason or another, had been enlisted specifically for recruiting duty, seeing no other service during the war; and experienced officers, well versed in the modern Marine Corps, were required to take over jobs that were held down during the war by retired officers called back to active duty to serve as recruiting officers.

The Division of Recruiting is composed of six recruiting divisions—Central, Midwestern, Northeastern, Southeastern, Southern, and Western, with their respective headquarters in Chicago, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, and San Francisco. Those divisions are divided into a total of 46 recruiting districts with district headquarters in the principal cities of the country, including division headquarters cities. The districts are subdivided into 98 sub-districts, each having headquarters in a town nearest the center of what is considered one of the most productive recruiting areas in the district. Itinerant recruiting parties, operating from district and sub-district headquarters, are employed to take the Marine Corps to the applicant via Marine


Corps motor vehicle or commercial transportation.

Division headquarters, normally headed by full colonels, are comparable to a battalion headquarters in most aspects of administration. Service record books are retained at headquarters of the divisions, and pay rolls, muster rolls, etc., are prepared and submitted by division headquarters, which also maintain property accounts for the division. First, second, and some phases of third echelon vehicle maintenance are carried out in division headquarters.

The actual recruiting process takes place in the districts, which have officers-in-charge with ranks of major, captain, and first lieutenant. Sub-stations are directed by noncommissioned officers.

Men accepted for enlistment at sub-stations and by itinerant recruiters are sent to the district headquarters concerned, where they are physically and mentally examined, their initial staff returns prepared, and the oath of enlistment is administered. From there they are transferred to the appropriate recruit depot.

The efficient new Marine Corps recruiting organization described above has so far done its postwar job well, but the real test is still ahead. In 1948 the six recruiting divisions are faced with the tremendous task of enlisting replacements for the 42,888 men scheduled to be discharged in that year. That assignment is dwarfed by the fact that the Recruiting Service



The traditional "Travel, Education, and Adventure" remain the recruiter's best bait.

must play the leading role in procuring by 30 January 1948, 80,000 more Marine Corps Reservists than we now have, in order to bring our Reserve strength up to the authorized 100,000 (30,000 in the Organized Marine Corps Reserve and 70,000 in the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve).

Something over eight years ago, in September 1939, the Marine Corps inaugurated what was then considered a gigantic emergency recruiting drive to bring its strength up to a goal of 25,000 men. Summing up the results of that drive in the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, June 1940, Col Frank E. Evans pointed out three cardinal factors that operated to delay successful recruiting in the initial stages of the operation. They were: delays in the reception of initial supplies (including office furniture); delays in securing adequate and suitable recruiting space; and the influx of untrained and often unsuitable personnel.

❖ A GREAT DEAL has been learned since the 1939 drive, perhaps partially due to Col Evans' article. This time, advance planning will make the 1948 recruiting program more nearly a routine than an emergency measure.

The prompt reception of initial supplies necessary for the approaching campaign will not pose the problems it did in 1939. The chain of supply to all levels of the recruiting establishment has been so expanded and the service sped up to the extent that little additional effort will be required in connection with logistics for in-

creased recruiting activity. In the case of office furniture, there is on hand in recruiting divisions enough old furniture in fairly good condition to take care of current needs and to furnish the new stations that may be established. To the delight of recruiters, \$500,000 worth of modern office equipment has been purchased and is on the way to replace the old furniture now in use.

The complicated administrative steps necessary to securing new commercial office space have not been simplified since 1939. However, many districts' offices which will likely be needed in 1948 were wisely left in operation after the first postwar recruiting campaign; procuring office space, therefore, will not seriously concern recruiting officers. Additional sub-stations will undoubtedly be established but they can function with only one room, if necessary, and even with current shortages that amount of space can be obtained rent free in federal buildings.

To insure an adequate number of experienced recruiting personnel, many marines who previously proved themselves successful recruiters are now reporting to recruiting divisions for duty. In order to provide a reservoir of trained recruiters and to permit a normal turnover in recruiting personnel, a six-week training course in recruiting procedure and methods has been set up in the newly activated Recruiters' School at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S. C.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps set up on 14 July 1947, the following points to govern the type of men from whom applications for recruiting duty are desired:

- (1) neat in appearance, soldierly in bearing and a representative type of marine,
- (2) have not been convicted by a court-martial during current enlistment,
- (3) have had at least two years of high school education or its equivalent, or have had clerical experience in the Marine Corps.
- (4) have completed at least three years of active Marine Corps service, a portion of which must have been outside the continental limits of the United States, and,
- (5) have at least two years to serve on current enlistment or extension.

Only men of the first four pay grades are considered for assignment to recruiting duty.

Recruiting duty is excellent for the individual marine for several reasons. It requires more initiative than any other duty that comes to mind and consequently develops initiative. Occasions that necessitate assuming responsibilities

arise in the Recruiting Service more often than perhaps any other during peacetime because recruiters are almost always on their own.

The nature of the duty teaches a great deal about Marine Corps administration. The duty is rarely monotonous because every enlistment provides some variation. More specifically, it is good duty because the \$3.50 extra pay per diem generally more than offsets the higher cost of living away from barracks.

Official office hours for recruiters are from 0800 to 1630 five days a week and from 0800 to 1200 on Saturday; but after-hours duty is commonplace. Policy and public expectancy require that in every possible case the Marine Corps participate in civic functions, parades, conventions, fairs, festivals, celebrations, and so on *ad infinitum*. Recruiters must do the participating in most cases, since regular Marine Corps posts and stations are so distant from the majority of inland towns. Standard Marine representation is in the form of a color guard but in many instances the appearance of an

The following recommendations are made for long range planning to improve the Recruiting Service:

(1) Assign only officers of the rank of captain and above as officers in charge of districts. The requirements of that position are considered too great to be handled by officers below the rank of captain and to require more experience and knowledge of administration than is usually possessed by lieutenants.

(2) Every district should be assigned a medical officer, preferably an experienced one who has served with marines in the field.

(3) Increase the number of permanent recruiters to 52, one for each district and division headquarters. The assignment of permanent recruiters on the foregoing basis is considered necessary in maintaining administrative continuity.

(4) Maintain, within budgetary limitations, a constant recruiting force. For example, when a recruiting drive ends, the strength of the Recruiting Service should not be reduced to the

"... Recruiters must also be constantly ready to sacrifice off duty hours to show Marine Corps movies at meetings of various civic organizations, attend Marine Corps League meetings, and they must act as escort for dignitaries who arrive in town. . ."

individual marine must suffice. These appearances take up many hours that would otherwise be off time. Recruiters must also be constantly ready to sacrifice off duty hours to show Marine Corps movies at meetings of various organizations, attend Marine Corps League meetings, and act as escorts for visiting dignitaries. Public ignorance of distinguishing devices worn by members of the armed forces often makes it necessary for marines to wear dress uniforms, even in hot weather, to prevent credit for their appearance going to the Army.

It has been estimated that 90 per cent of recruiting duties are clerical and every successful recruiter has to do at least some typing, whether or not it is of the hunt and peck variety. The forms that must be accomplished on every man enlisted are numerous and several are necessary merely to accept an applicant. Purchasing gasoline and oil and securing emergency repairs insert a clerical angle into routine motor vehicle trips. In that connection, few recruiters can avoid becoming qualified drivers and possessors of government licenses.

minimum. Personnel detailed as recruiters for the emergency should be retained to maintain contacts, obtain information on prospective applicants, and keep waiting lists. Using this system, recruiting emergencies, which will always arise from time to time, can be more easily and efficiently dealt with.

(5) Establish set tours of duty of four years for recruiters who satisfactorily perform their duties. When recruiters are detailed for an emergency period only, they should be so informed, and the regular recruiters should be cognizant of the fact in order to prevent their assuming that the new recruiters will relieve them at the close of the drive.

(6) The maximum number of offices should be kept open after recruiting drives, especially rent-free offices, to avoid delay, work, and the necessity of accepting inferior locations, in the same localities when future drives are initiated.

(7) Absorb into the Recruiting Service as many first pay grade men as possible who are in excess of authorized allowances at posts and stations,

US MC

Japan's Navy and the Battle of Midway

ALTHOUGH VARIOUS EXCELLENT ACCOUNTS of the Battle of Midway, the first great turning point in the Pacific War, have appeared both in books and in the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE during the five years since the battle was fought, the accounts have almost invariably been presented from our own point of view. Such a point of view, of course, was not only natural but was actually made necessary by the dearth of reliable reports from Japanese sources. At long last, however, certain official Japanese studies of the battle have been made available, and this article is written with the hope that its contents may help round out the story of one of the most fascinating chapters in our remarkable naval and marine history.¹

By Bertram Vogel

AT 2300 ON 2 JUNE² Adm Nagumo, Commander of the First Air Fleet, Japan's Mobile Force, took a last look about him on the bridge of the aircraft carrier *Akagi* and happily concluded that he was a very lucky man. True, the fog was so thick that he could see nothing, and all his ships were being navigated blindly, but Adm Nagumo was the kind of man who depended upon his mind rather than upon his eyes. Besides, if he could see nothing, neither could the enemy. And already his huge striking force was well on its way to Midway.

Returning to his cabin, Adm Nagumo permitted himself the luxury of munificence. He greeted with unaccustomed warmth the junior officer who flattened himself against the bulkhead to make way, and at the entrance to his cabin he nodded pleasantly to the special marine who stood rigidly at attention. It was, after all, not given to every man to play so great a role in the history of his country's navy

—and the Admiral knew that this time his country's navy would really outdo itself. While the once-proud Americans continued to patch up the feeble remnants of their battered fleet, he would lead the major and most powerful units of Adm Yamamoto's Combined Fleet to the glorious conquest of Midway. From Midway one would easily be able to control Pearl Harbor, and from Pearl Harbor . . . Yes, the Ad-

miral was quite pleased.

After bowing stiffly to the portrait of the Emperor that hung in his cabin, the Admiral seated himself in his favorite chair. Then, picking up his intelligence evaluation of the situation, he read it leisurely for the tenth time:

Because of developments during the First Phase Operations, the enemy's outposts which he had relied on to be his first line of defense, collapsed one after another until he began to feel direct threats even to such areas as India, Australia, and Hawaii. The enemy was exerting every pressure to stem this tide by stepping up his submarine strength in the Australia area. He employed these to carry on guerrilla type tactics. Task force thrusts were also made in the Western and South-western Pacific.

These seemed to indicate that the enemy was planning on more positive actions than heretofore.

Subsequent to the beating he received in the Coral Sea on 7-8 May, the enemy was temporarily subdued, but by the end of May—by the time the Fleet was about to sortie from Hashira Jima—the enemy again began to show considerable life in all areas, particularly in the Australia area.

Midway acts as a sentry for Hawaii. Its importance was further enhanced after the loss of Wake and it was apparent that the enemy was expediting the reinforcing of its defensive installation, its air base facilities, and other military installations as well as the personnel.

The Admiral liked a good thing when he saw it,

¹Bibliography for this article includes *The Campaign of the Pacific War, Interrogations of Japanese Officials*, Vols. I and II, and Op Nav P32-1002, "The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway," prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Op Nav P32-1002 is a translation of Japan's CinC First Air Fleet Detailed Battle Report No. 6, which was a secret document intended only for Japan's highest echelons and therefore presumably frank. It was discovered by the United States after the war.

²All dates and times are in Tokyo Time (Plus Nine).

Adm Nagumo led the most powerful units of Japan's Imperial Navy toward Midway Island, confident of an easy victory. Wildcat fighters intercepted his bomber strike near Midway as Army, Navy and Marine planes destroyed his proud armada

and the estimates of American air strength at Midway were very much to his liking. There was, according to his information, one squadron of fighters, one squadron of Army bombers, and two squadrons of reconnaissance flying boats.³ Among the enemy's carriers, the *Ranger* was believed to be in the Atlantic and the *Lexington* either sunk or under repair on the West Coast. The *Enterprise* and the *Hornet* were known to be in the Pacific, but the location of the *Wasp* was uncertain. An additional three auxiliary carriers were also believed to be in the Pacific, but they were definitely slow, and both Adm Nagumo and Adm Yamamoto had chuckled over the absurdity of regarding them as a serious threat.

As far as the American Navy was concerned, Adm Nagumo had scant fears. What opposition could it possibly put up? Indeed, as he paused to re-read his estimate of the situation, he agreed inwardly that there was not the slightest reason to change his impressions. In the first place, he noted, the enemy lacks the will to fight—although he was prepared to concede that the United States might counterattack. In the second place, he assured himself, the enemy conducted his air reconnaissance chiefly to the west and to the south, neglecting a strict vigil to the north and northwest. And of course the Admiral was certain that the enemy knew nothing of Japan's plans.

Other assurances were equally to be found in the Admiral's carefully recorded estimates. Among them was the simple statement—very convincing on paper—that the enemy had no powerful unit with carriers as its nucleus in the vicinity. He concluded that after pounding Midway by air and destroying its shore-based air strength, it would be a simple matter to overwhelm any United States task force which might dare to show itself.

The Admiral grinned broadly. He decided to snatch a few hours of sleep.

³This was an unusually sound estimate for the Japanese. In reality, there were 30 PBY's, one Marine Dive-Bombing Squadron of 34 planes, one Marine Fighter Squadron of 28 Planes, and 21 Army bombers (4 B-26's and 17 B-17's) and 6 Navy TBF's ordered up from Hawaii.

II


THE ADMIRAL awoke early the following morning, 4 June Tokyo time, and after a hasty breakfast of light cakes and tea, stepped out on deck to see for himself how much the fog had lifted. Except for scattered clouds, conditions were good and visibility on the surface satisfactory.

During the morning and afternoon, the Admiral's proud striking force steamed ahead. The battleship *Kirishima*, flanked by a fast destroyer and the light cruiser *Nagara*, led the way. Astern of the *Kirishima* were the four carriers, *Hiryu* and *Soryu* to port, and the flagship *Akagi* and *Kaga* to starboard. Flanking the carriers to port were two destroyers and the heavy cruiser *Tone*, and on the starboard side were a similar number of destroyers and the heavy cruiser *Chikuma*. Following were the battleship *Haruna* and five or six more destroyers. It was a huge and formidable task force.



BERTAM VOGEL taught a year at the University of Illinois and had a year of writing and editing in New York before entering the Navy as a language intelligence officer. Assigned to the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, he

interrogated Japanese prisoners for a year and a half and then was transferred to the Staff, Commander Fifth Fleet, serving first under Adm Spruance and then Adm Towers. He concluded his tour of active duty as Assistant Fleet Intelligence Officer. Now 29 and a civilian again, he is a free lance writer.



Midway Atoll, with its two small islands, Sand and Eastern, was the last remaining American bastion in the Central Pacific. This was the target for the Japanese Fleet.

For the most part the afternoon was uneventful. Then suddenly, at 1640, the *Tone*, one of the two supporting heavy cruisers, reported to the Admiral. She had sighted ten enemy planes bearing 260°. Three fighters were almost instantly dispatched by the *Akagi* to pursue the planes, but they failed to find them and returned to the ship promptly. Later, at 2330, the *Akagi* herself twice sighted what presumably were American planes darting in and out of the clouds, and all hands were ordered to battle stations. But Adm Nagumo was actually unperturbed. He recorded in his notes that he doubted the reliability of the three sightings.

Nevertheless, the Admiral decided to play it safe. Two hours later, at 0130 on 5 June,⁴ he issued new orders, and under the command of the *Hiryu's* flight officer, Lt Tomonaga, 36 fighters, 36 bombers, and 36 torpedo planes flew off the carriers for Midway. A half dozen others were sent out to scout the area to the south and to the east.

Lt Tomonaga's planes took to the air in precise V formations at 12,000 feet, and it did the Lieutenant's heart good to observe how worthy they were of the great mission entrusted to them. Then the Lieutenant jotted down some notes: The weather was cloudy and the amount of clouds, 8. Ceiling was 500 to 1000 meters, visibility about 25 miles. But there was good reason to believe that the weather would be clear over Midway. What more could one ask?

Forty miles from Midway the Lieutenant had his answer. For swooping down from the skies above him were Wildcats.

While Lt Tomonaga's fighters twisted and turned to meet them, his bombers, suddenly aware that not every day was to be another Pearl Harbor, roared ahead for their primary targets on Sand and Eastern Islands. Engaged in furious aerial combat by American Marine fighters undaunted by the hordes of Zero's on their tails, and harassed by the deadly ack-ack of island installations and of PT boats, they dropped their horrible cargo. A stocky pilot in Squadron 1 was entranced when he saw the bright flames suddenly shoot up from the fuel storage tank at the northern tip of Sand. A moment later he was literally in heaven as an Avenger ripped his fuselage into bits with machine gun fire.

But the Japanese were disappointed. At 0415 the command plane of the *Hiryu* radioed the fleet that it was imperative that a second attack be carried out against Midway. The radioman was quite agitated as he sent the message.

III

☛ LIKE MOST JAPANESE, even those of the very highest echelon, Adm Nagumo did not relish making decisions alone. But this time he was confident. Only half an hour earlier a wave of American planes had commenced a vicious attack against his fleet itself, but the onslaught had been ineffectual. He had ordered a large number of torpedo planes to stand by in readiness for a possible attack by American surface vessels, but now, in response to the request made by his planes at Midway, he was forced to change his order. Troop ships to the southwest were to follow him to Midway. The island would have to be knocked out.

⁴By our reckoning, of course, this was 4 June.

Immediately the ship-based attack planes began the frantic task of removing their torpedoes and replacing them with number eighty land bombs.⁵

In the meantime the Admiral's resplendent striking force had its own troubles. Steaming ahead at 28 knots, it was now preparing to take on its fighters. The *Nagara* and the *Kirishima* continued to lay down smoke screens.

And then, at about 0500, the *Tone's* conscientious reconnaissance plane sent in the message for which the Admiral had been waiting: "Sighted what appears to be the enemy composed of 10 (ships), bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway, on course 150 degrees, speed 20 knots." Half an hour later the Admiral knew the worst. The *Tone's* plane has reported "what appears to be a carrier." The Admiral walked leisurely into his cabin and composed a dispatch for Adm Yamamoto. He concluded that "After taking on the returning planes, we shall proceed north to contact and destroy the enemy task force." It has been said that the Admiral was an optimistic man.

"... And then, within ten minutes, all hell broke loose. For at 0700 fourteen American torpedo planes, in two groups, roared in from the northwest and attacked the carrier Akagi, flagship of Adm Nagumo's fleet. One explosion after another shook her..."

☛ BUT THAT WAS AT 0605—and was probably true at 0650, when the *Akagi* recorded that surface units had suffered almost no damage and that the skies were clear of enemy aircraft.

And then, within ten minutes, all hell broke loose. For at 0700 fourteen American torpedo planes, in two groups, roared in from the northwest.

The two groups made directly for the *Akagi* and the *Kaga*, which was astern of her. In an effort to minimize the target area, the *Akagi* turned to course 300 degrees. The *Chikuma* opened up directional fire with her starboard AA, then brought her main guns to bear. The *Tone* hastily dispatched seven fighters to engage the enemy, went into evasive action to starboard, then opened fire.

But while the four carriers desperately maneuvered to avoid the "persistent enemy torpedo planes," the *Kaga* sighted nine dive bombers at 0722. Four minutes later the *Akagi* made a similar observation, but before she could do anything, a direct hit caught her on the after rim of the

elevator amidships and another on the rear guard of the port flight deck. The *Kaga*, which had evaded the first three bombs, was not so lucky with the fourth, which smashed her aft, to starboard. And number seven, a direct hit near the forward elevator, was terrific. Glass on the bridge shattered in all directions, and the smoke of the bombs reduced visibility to zero.

But the *Kaga's* captain, who by now had ordered that emergency steering apparatus be put in operation, was in a sense quite fortunate that he couldn't see. For if he had, he would have seen the *Soryu* smashed three times within as many minutes—and he would have seen, too, the bomb that hurtled down upon his forward elevator. He was spared that last humiliation. When number nine struck amidship, the *Kaga's* air officer, who had taken over the task of fire-fighting, was about ready to yield. He had the Emperor's portrait transferred to the destroyer *Hagikaze*.

The *Akagi's* plight was almost as bad. One induced explosion after another shook her in suc-

cession, and the fire, flaming forward with great intensity from the after quarters, now threatened the bridge. Her skipper, in a desperate effort to avert complete disaster, ordered the ammunition rooms flooded and all hands to fire-fighting stations. But fate, which had been with him in the past, now chose to desert him. His pump system refused to function. At 0746 Adm Nagumo, who had had enough, transferred his flag to the *Nagara*. And at 1038 the Emperor's portrait was similarly removed to the destroyer *Nowake*.

For the *Soryu*, struck for the first time at 0725, disaster was almost instantaneous. By 0730 she was completely enveloped by flames, and by 0740 both her engines had stopped. Five minutes later her commanding officer, Capt Yanagimoto, gave the order to abandon ship. But as his officers and men pushed up on deck to escape the terrible flames, Capt Yanagimoto himself stood weeping on the signal tower to the starboard of the bridge. "Every man to safety," he cried out. "Let no man approach me." As the flames slowly engulfed him, he continued his defiant shouts of *banzai*. And then suddenly a terrific explosion rocked the ship. Men aboard the *Hamakaze* and *Isonami* turned violently away from the sight

⁵Total weight 805 kg. The other land bomb which the Japanese were then using was number twenty-eight, total weight 242 kg.



This was the cruiser *Mogami*, shelled, battered, and beaten, after colliding with the *Mikuma*. The *Mogami* limped home but the *Mikuma* was finished off by SBDs.

of the *Soryu's* crew topside hurtling high into space.

FROM HIS POSITION aboard the *Nagara*, Adm Nagumo surveyed the wreckage about him. He was low in spirit, but he was not yet crushed. At least the *Hiryu* was left, and he intended to make good use of her. At 0830 he radioed Adm Yamamoto that he still planned to attack before leading his forces north. At 0859 he ordered his ships to assemble and to prepare to attack the enemy. Proceeding on a course of 170°, the tired units crawled ahead at 12 knots.

The *Hiryu's* planes took off with the avowed purpose of destroying the enemy's carriers. And while Adm Nagumo's surface units moved slowly ahead, a second wave soared through the skies toward the enemy. But the Admiral was nervous. It took a message, at 0945, that an "enemy carrier is burning" to calm him. Fifteen minutes later, for the first time since he had left Hashira Jima, he had an inkling of where he stood. He was informed that the *Yorktown*, the *Enterprise*, and the *Hornet* were on the high seas against him.

What course of action Adm Nagumo would

have pursued on his own at this critical juncture, we shall probably never know. For at 1010 a secret dispatch from Adm Yamamoto ordered him to attack the enemy fleet. The occupation of Midway was to be "temporarily postponed."

And then once again there was dreadful confusion as one conflicting report after another came in. One carrier plane reported five cruisers and a burning carrier 90 miles away. At an identical time a plane from the *Haruna* had sighted five large cruisers and five carriers which were all afire. And within a few minutes another plane reported that there were definitely three enemy carriers—presumably not on fire. But the *Tone's* number four plane delivered the message that constituted the final straw. The enemy had six cruisers and six destroyers, but 20 miles ahead there was "what appears to be one carrier."

The whole mess was either sheer nonsense or the most miserable sort of duplication and inaccuracy. The Admiral didn't know what to believe. He wished that he were in three other places.

At this precise moment Adm Yamamoto's Chief of Staff chose to query the striking force.

Marine Aviation at Midway

✿ MARINE AIR GROUP 22, consisting of VMF 221 and VMSB 231, was the only Marine Corps aviation unit at Midway, when the Japanese struck the island on the morning of 4 June, 1942. The fighters intercepted the Jap air armada of 100 carrier planes 30 miles out of Midway and, despite the Japanese fighter superiority of better than two to one, immediately engaged them. Only 12 Jap bombers and fighters broke through to hit the island.

Meanwhile the dive bombers attacked the Japanese invasion navy and scored direct hits on two carriers. Heavy flak and intensive fighter plane action forced a second wave of dive bombers to change their target to a battleship. The battleship was left smoking badly and listing heavily. The invasion was turned back at a terrible price to the Marines. The victory cost 15 fighter pilots, 11 dive bomber pilots, and 12 rear gunners. In return VMF 221 pilots had destroyed 37 and a possible 43 planes. The rear gunners of VMSB accounted for several more, while their pilots had scored direct hits on two carriers and two battleships.

He wanted to know whether the Admiral thought it would be possible for friendly units to make use of Midway's shore bases on the following day. It has been said that Adm Yamamoto, too, was an optimistic man.

But the final shock was yet to come—and it came in the form of thirteen American dive bombers which descended upon the hapless *Hiryu* at 1403. For four long and intolerable hours the crew battled the fiery inferno, but their efforts were in vain. Finally, after the last man in the engine room had been literally reduced to ashes, Capt Kaki summoned his men to hear his message. There was an expression of reverence for the Emperor and the shoutings of *banzai*, and then the command and battle flags were lowered. The Emperor's portrait was transferred, and the ship's crew followed in silence. Shortly afterwards the destroyer *Makigumo* finished off the listing *Hiryu* with a single torpedo. And much to the consternation of some Japanese in the water elsewhere, the American submarine *Nautilus*, coming out of nowhere, did the same for the dying *Soryu* with three.

✿ AT 1530 the commander of the *Chikuma* reported that one of his planes had sighted four enemy carriers, six cruisers, and fifteen destroyers proceeding westward about 30 miles east of the burning American carrier, but Adm Yamamoto chose to take a different view of the desperate situation. His secret dispatch to Adm Nagumo, ludicrous in view of the actual facts, must have made Adm Nagumo's hair stand on end:

1. The enemy fleet, which has practically been destroyed, is retiring to the east.

2. Combined Fleet units in the vicinity are preparing to pursue the remnants and at the same time, to occupy AF (Midway).

3. The Main Unit is scheduled to reach position (grid) FU ME RI 32 on course 90 degrees, speed 20 knots, by 0000, 6th.

4. The Mobile Force, Occupation Force (less CruDiv 7), and Advance Force will immediately contact and attack the enemy.

Adm Nagumo concluded—rather wisely under the circumstances—that Adm Yamamoto was laboring under a misapprehension concerning the enemy. Remnants of the American fleet? The whole thing was absurd. For three hours he attempted, unsuccessfully, to clarify the situation for Adm Yamamoto, but the latter refused to accept the facts. At 1950 he tried once again. Five minutes later he had his reward. He was informed by radio that a new commander, CinC Second Fleet, would take command of the striking force. And at 2355 he was further informed, in a classic of understatement, that the occupation of Midway had been cancelled.

But the new commander was equally unsuccessful. In his hasty retreat homeward he suffered a rather embarrassing loss when two of his best cruisers, the *Mogami* and the *Mikuma*, collided heavily while maneuvering to evade the American submarine *Tambor*. A group of SBDs and TBFs put the *Mikuma* out of her misery, but the *Mogami*, battered and smashed and shelled and beaten, staggered home to safety. She was a peculiarly appropriate symbol of what was to come.

US ✿ MC

The Marines in the Pacific War

Chapter 18

MARINES UNDER MacARTHUR; CAPE GLOUCESTER

WAR IS A BUSINESS IN WHICH THERE IS never too much of anything, nor indeed enough to make things go as rapidly and decisively as a commander could wish. Down in Australia they were, at the close of 1942, still nervous about being invaded in spite of the fully appreciated air and naval victories off Guadalcanal, the fact that one Jap point had been blunted at Milne Bay and another turned round in the opposite direction on the Kokoda Trail. The Australians wanted a division for security purposes; specifically their own 9th Division, which was serving with Montgomery in Egypt. That officer had just broken Rommel's front in the truly decisive clash of Alamein. In fact, the battle had not yet been fought when the first request for the 9th came through. The British were in no mood to spare the men who might make the Egyptian victory permanent by a thundering pursuit. The matter went to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who made decisions in that vague domain where strategy and politics are one. Ruled: that the Australians could not have their 9th Division back but would receive an American division instead. That division was the 1st Marine, just out of the Guadalcanal fighting and (thus things are dovetailed) sent down to Melbourne for "reorganization, reequipment and recreation."

Of all three the division stood much in need. Replacements reached it in Australia and were shaken down into the organization; there were some changes of command by the natural process of promoting officers out. One of them brought MajGen William H. Rupertus to the head of the division with Col Amor Sims as his chief of staff and BrigGen Lemuel H. Shepherd as assistant division commander. The really important feature of this Melbourne idyll however, is that the division was now in the Southwest Pacific, the MacArthur command area, and at a time when MacArthur was permitting the press to make public complaint for him that his theatre of the

war was starved for troops. He determined to use the 1st Marine Division as his own; and he wished to use it specifically in an operation against New Britain island, at the northern end of which stands Rabaul, the center of the Southwest Pacific war. The planning stage began in June at Brisbane but it was not until the last

By Fletcher Pratt

day of August (this is 1943) that the first operations orders were issued. They made the 1st Marine Division a part of the "Alamo" Force, the U. S. Sixth Army, under LtGen Walter Krueger; and they looked forward to the capture of all western New Britain up to a line running from Gasmata across to Talasea. Airfields would be set up in this area "for operations against Rabaul," a somewhat vague statement which reflects a similar vagueness in the minds of our high commanders at the time. At this date it was not certain that the great Jap base could be neutralized from air and sea; an overland campaign might be necessary. In any case the airfield at Cape Gloucester on the western end of New Britain was needed before the move to the Philippines along the coast of New Guinea could go ahead.

This August plan looked forward to a landing at Gasmata on the southern coast, followed shortly after by one on the north coast and made the date November. The information as to enemy strength was exceedingly good and quite plentiful, the Australians having excellent coast-watchers on New Britain and Gen MacArthur's 5th Air Force being very active in getting photos. Cape Gloucester held an old commercial airstrip, not in very good shape, and a quite good one built by the Japs, with something between 1,200 and 1,500 troops. Gasmata had a small strip and 800 to 1,000 of the enemy; Talasea a partly developed strip and about a battalion. All these places might as well have been on little separate islands, since central New Britain is the fiercest kind of jungle country, as bad as Bougainville.

The 5th Regiment, which was in reserve, was called up to capture the airfields as monsoon rains, long tight lines, and Japanese infiltration attempts kept the 7th fully occupied. Strategically, this beachhead operation was nearly useless

As September deepened into October and more information was accumulated the Gasmata landing was dropped from the plan. The strip there was not in use and the land on which it lay was so impossible that to make it suitable for our airplanes would involve both more time and more men than MacArthur was willing to spend on a field not very near the scene of anticipated future action. The Marine division, which was to carry the ball, had meanwhile moved up to staging areas at the eastern end of New Guinea—the 5th Regiment to Milne Bay, the 7th to Oro Bay and the remainder to Goodenough Island. It was doing advanced jungle training.

At the last of these places there was another and more detailed staff conference in early November. The original date for the landing would be upon them in a very few days and it was clear that such a date could not be met for two reasons. One was the transport situation. The only two big transports available were Australian ships equipped with nothing but the normal ships' boats. It was held necessary to use U.S. APDs, which could get around fast under air attack and which carried their own landing boats, since it was a virtual certainty that the landing would be strongly opposed by enemy planes. (At that date Sherman's and Montgomery's big carrier strikes on Rabaul were just being delivered and were finding plenty of Jap aviation.) All the APDs in the area were, and would be for some time, supporting the 3d Marines and 37th Army Divisions on Bougainville.

The other detaining factor was a shortage of cruisers for supporting fire. RearAdm Kinkaid, who commanded the 7th Fleet under MacArthur's orders, had available at the moment only that veteran of the Southwest Pacific, the light cruiser *Phoenix*. He had been promised *Nashville*, now back in the States for repairs, but she could not arrive much before the middle of December which date was itself no good, since it meant making the approach under a full "bombers' moon." There were a pair of Australian heavy cruisers, but they had so much draft it was not certain they could close in enough for effective support. All the other ships were wanted up in the Gilberts, where it was not unlikely that our

advance would be opposed by the main Jap fleet. There was certainly something to MacArthur's complaint about running his war on a shoestring.

THE DELAY to late December had the inconvenience that it would throw the landing date into the monsoon season, when rain to the extent of 20 inches a day falls on New Britain; and also it gave the Japs time to reinforce those outposts over which the shadows were gathering. At the November conference, Col Edwin A. Pollock, the old Guadalcanal hand and now divisional G-3, said frankly that the allotment of troops for Operation Backhander (the Cape Gloucester attack) was quite insufficient. That allotment had not in fact been changed from the August plan which embraced a double landing. The arrangement then was to land one battalion west of the airfield on the Cape, the other two of the same regiment east of it. This was very well as against 1,200 Japs, but there was a new, late report from MacArthur's headquarters that the number of enemies in there had shot up to nearly 8,000. A single regimental combat team would have rough going against so many. "You will have to speak to your unit commander about that," said Gen MacArthur, but it was quite evident that he agreed, and though Gen Krueger was at first annoyed at this going over the head of his Sixth Army Staff, he was a just man and reasonable, and the plan was revised.

It now called for LtCol James M. Masters' 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to land west of the airfield with some guns and block the coastal trail which was the only practical method of movement either for reinforcements or for the retreat in that direction of the airfield garrison. The 7th, under Col Julian Frisbie, would land about five air line miles east of the airfields on the shores of Borgen Bay, followed closely by the remainder of Col William J. Whaling's 1st Regiment. Col John T. Selden's 5th Regiment would be the reserve afloat and the 32d Army Division in distant reserve behind. Part of the latter's units would land at Arawe on the southern coast on 15 December to give us a *pied à terre* there, but were expected to have no great difficulty as Arawe held but few Japs.



Their dungarees blending with the terrain, a single file of Jap-hunting marines advances cautiously through the dense rain forests adjacent to Cape Gloucester.

There are some wide fields of kunai grass just south of the Cape Gloucester airfield. Gen Krueger planned to drop a battalion of Army paratroopers there, the 503d, still further to confuse the enemy's counsels and split his forces. But this feature was cut from the plan by Gen MacArthur himself. The ground for the purpose was very rough, the kunai grass taller than a man and there had been some casualties from fire in similar country during the big drop that preceded the pinching out of Salamaua in New Guinea. A detachment of Australians, familiar with the country and the peculiar natives who live in it, accompanied the expedition. From their information and elaborate photos plaster relief maps were built. Down at Goodenough every man of the expeditionary force went over them till the details of the terrain were fixed in his mind and it is enough to say now that this part of the plan worked out perfectly. When the landing was made nobody got lost and everybody steered by geographical features he could recognize at once.

The new table of organization provided that the regiment of engineers formerly attached to each Marine division should become a battalion, but a great deal of difficulty was anticipated in moving through the roadless jungle, so the 1st

kept its 17th Marines, the engineers, and even augmented them for this operation by attaching the 19th Battalion of Seabees. The expedition would lack the close air support normal in Marine operations, since the only cooperation planes in the area were Army A-20s, whose pilots had not trained with marines.

D day was finally set for 26 December; the total strength of the division was 18,677.

II

THE JAPANESE ARMY uses all sorts of oddly designated formations with meaningless numbers and the command at Cape Gloucester was one of these, the 65th Brigade, apparently so called because there were not 64 others like it, nor even one. The commander was MajGen Iwao Matsuda, who was directly under Gen Hiteshi Imamura at Rabaul, an officer whose exalted rank had somewhat dimmed Gen Hyakutake's luster when the former came down to set up shop as head of the 8th Army Group at Rabaul. This command included Hyakutake's 17th Army and the 18th Army as well as Matsuda's Brigade.

The Brigade has been organized in 1941; Matsuda had seen it through a period of special jungle training before taking it down for the campaign on Bataan, where it had won a cita-

tion. So did nearly every other Bataan formation; the special distinction of the 65th was that it managed to keep its medical casualties down.

The Brigade originally had three infantry regiments like a division, but each of them contained only two battalions and things were still further muddled in the winter of '42, when one of the regiments was taken from the Brigade to be sent up into the Mandates, being replaced by two artillery and two antiaircraft artillery battalions. Most of another regiment, the 142d, was still in the Philippines at the date of which we speak and the elements of that formation which had reached New Britain were at Talasea.

The garrison at Cape Gloucester thus consisted of the remaining regiment, the 141st, the four artillery battalions, an extra mountain artillery battalion and a strong Shipping Engineer unit, say 6,600 men all told, with another 500 out on Rooke Island. The 53d Regiment of Hyakutake's command was spread along the eastern shore of New Britain in remote support. Matsuda expected to be attacked, but in the enervating heat and the frightful jungle conditions there had not been time to dig proper positions. There were good stocks of food and medical supplies, but malaria and dysentery had already set in despite the Brigade's precautions, and nearly a quarter of the men were incapacitated. The overall plan of Gen Matsuda's defense was to hold the beach and coast trails with relatively light forces. His artillery was partly on a 450 foot elevation just behind Silimati Point where it juts into Borgen Bay, partly on a taller hill farther south and partly in the jungle-covered draws close behind the airfield. Beginning on 19 December, as many as 50 heavy bombers of the land type began coming over every day and Gen Matsuda knew that the hour of destiny could not be far distant, especially as these big craft were followed by flights of light B-25s at low level which demolished all the buildings not concealed under jungle.

III

☛ CHRISTMAS DAY, clear and windless, found the invasion convoy running steadily up through Vitiav Strait. For the men below it was paralyzingly hot. Beside *Nashville* and *Phoenix*, RearAdm D. E. Barbey, in command of the attack force, had two Australian cruisers, *Australia* and *Shropshire*, with destroyers *Shaw*, *Drayton*, *Mugford*, *Bagley*, *Lamson*, *Hutchins*, *Beale*, *Daly*, *Brownson*. Other destroyers *Flusser*, *Mahan*, *Reid*, *Shaw*, and *Smith* were to, and did,

furnish close support. The monsoon still held off, but that night its forerunner arrived in the form of clouds that slid in to hide the moon. This was considered a good augury; it might permit the convoy to escape observation from Japanese outposts on islands in the straits—a hope which proved vain, incidentally, for Rooke Island had marked the dark silhouettes and warned Matsuda.

As it happened this did the Japanese no good, nor did the fact that the ships carrying the troops and furnishing fire cover had to work so slowly through almost totally uncharted reefs running to 7,000 yards off the coast (*Flusser* and *Mahan* had to use radar to find breaks in it) that there was no surprise. The previous air attacks had been heavy; our cruisers were the 15-gunned ships that get off nearly ten salvos a minute. Just after they opened fire no less than 65 B-24s and 50 B-25s came over to drop 215 tons of bombs, the largest concentration yet seen in the Southwest Pacific.

A hill reaches up out of the jungle southwest of the beaches, where some Jap artillery had been located. Our people called it Target Hill; it was so drenched with white phosphorous as to be

Mud at Cape Gloucester was worse than Japs; here a corduroy road is being built.



completely invisible and to all that firing as landing craft came in the enemy replied with a single shot from a single gun. The B-25s made strafing runs till the first wave was only 500 yards from the beach; the Japs were too much hurt and stunned to offer any opposition at all as the assault wave of Battalions 1 and 3, 7th, went in from their Higgins boats standing up at 0745.

☛ TO FIND THEMSELVES in a jungle worse than Bougainville. A tall man could lie with his head under the cover of the vegetation line and his feet out in the water; that was how wide the beach was. Those who penetrated the jungle line had to do it by cutting their way in with machetes, and when they did so found themselves on ground which the map (perhaps in a strained effort at humor) called "damp flat." The intermittent rains of what New Britain considered its dry season had reduced the ground to ankle-deep sludge; from ankle level to far overhead was the abatis of tangled stinging vegetation. This had been foreseen; amphtracs and bulldozers followed close on the heels of the combat infantry and began to cut lanes toward the areas where dumps were to be established.

Meanwhile the troops were being poured rapidly ashore and were spreading into the "damp flat" behind. By 1015 all three battalions of the 7th were in with their supporting elements and the 3d Battalion, 1st; Gen Rupertus had set up his CP ashore and the gap between the two beachheads had been closed, incidentally engulfing a small Jap supply dump. During the morning the 1st Battalion, 7th, pushed southwest and made contact with some of the enemy on Target Hill, where they rapidly beat down resistance from a couple of Jap battalion guns and anchored the southern front of the beachhead. The fact is that most of the enemy positions on the hill were unoccupied; the Marines had reached them before the Japs who had left under the bombing could return. Next in line northward was the 2d Battalion, 7th; they met some resistance and took some casualties in the green gloom but smashed through, took a big supply dump full of food, ammunition, and medical supplies and dug in for the night 900 yards from the water. The 3d Battalion, 7th, carried the perimeter on around its northern rim. The 3d Battalion, 1st, attacked to the northwest along the coast trail; ran into a small group of pill-boxes, reduced them rapidly and also dug in.

The 1st Battalion, 1st, landed during the afternoon, along with a supply echelon, and while that was going on the Japs came down from Kavieng with a passionate air attack. They ran into four flights of P-38s from Dobodura in New Guinea which were furnishing the afternoon air cover. Now these Japs were the "relic" air groups of the 24th and 25th Air Flotillas, which had been so badly battered in the fighting for Bougainville and the aborted attack on Montgomery's carriers—a few survivors who had survived because they kept out of harm's way and a lot of bold but badly trained new pilots. They lost no less than 59 planes to four of ours. A few broke through to rush the unloading LSTs from low altitude; here we lost a couple of planes, for a flight of B-25s were just going over at low level in the opposite direction and two of them got caught in the barrage our ships put up. Bombs jarred the bay and water sprayed on all the ships, but no cigar.

At twilight the Japs sent down another attack and that might have been serious since the hour was so late our fighters had gone home to tuck themselves in for the night; but with their usual skill in choosing the wrong objective, the enemy let the piled supplies on the beach alone and fell on the retreating convoy. A torpedo damaged the destroyer *Brownson* so badly she foundered during the night and a hole was knocked in the side of one LST, paid for with two planes.

Landing successful, then, supplies coming in according to plan, divisional casualties for this first day 21 killed, 23 wounded. The proportion of killed for wounded was high; it shows the damage was mostly by sniper fire and that these Japs were good shots.

IV

☛ DURING THE NIGHT the enemy counter-attacked, of course, especially at the weak joint of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th, where a battery of special weapons men arrived just in time to plug the gap, fighting with small arms. The enemy got nothing but casualties for his trouble; but as the last wave of his attack turned squalling back into the jungle cover, the monsoon broke overhead and water came down in thick straight lines, a drench that was to continue uninterrupted for five days and nights. This must be remembered as the background to all the rest of the operation. The division could use none of its numerous trucks in mud where even jeeps foundered and had to be hauled out with winches;

where artillery pieces were in above the wheel-hubs; where amphtracs were the only means of supply, and where marines in their spotted jungle clothing were wet to the skin the first night and did not dry out for weeks. The little streams were all torrents, engineers and Seabees no sooner set up a bridge than it went out, cooks at the galleys stood in water to their knees and it was hot, hot, hot. A sergeant gazed at a B-25 running past beneath the streaming skies and said; "If I was flying one of those things I'd be halfway from a private to a general. I don't know how I got into this business."

Under the rains the attack picked up again on 27 December, Col Whaling's 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Regiment, moving northwestward along the coastal trail while the 7th dug in a perimeter engulfing Silimati Point, and inched toward the jungle slopes inland. It had been intended that the rightmost elements of this regiment, from the 1st Battalion, should support the flank of Whaling's advance, but during the morning there were constant tappings and attempts

from the pieces they were supposed to serve and they were now down on the 7th's front, unable to get back save by an impossible circuit through mountain jungle.

These, really the bulk of the Jap force, were keeping the 7th fully occupied, not because they were so very active but because it was necessary to maintain long and tight lines in blind country to keep the enemy from infiltrating into the vital supply area of the original beachhead. There were thus only the two battalions of Whaling's regiment for the attack on the airfield on which it was now closing. Gen Rupertus had already decided that he would have to use his reserve regiment, the 5th, to capture the field, and had secured from 6th Army the release of one of its battalions, originally intended to clear out the Jap nest on Rooke Island. The first two battalions of the fresh regiment reached the beachhead early on the morning of 29 December and were immediately dispatched to join the airfield front, partly by road and partly by Higgins boats along the shore.

"... During the night the enemy counterattacked of course, especially at the weak joints of the 2d and 3d battalions, 7th, where a battery of special weapons men came in to plug the gap, fighting with small arms. The Japanese casualties were heavy..."

at infiltration along the 7th's whole front. The regiment had to stay where it was. Whaling pushed ahead anyway, finding along the shore a mess of wrecked barges, some positions for 75s and finally some pillboxes flanking the trail, which were disposed of by the tanks. Night found the 1st well ahead of schedule; it set up a little separate perimeter of its own and the artillery had reached position to fire support by dark.

28 December was spent by the 7th in merely improving positions and in patrols—particularly on the front of the 2d Battalion in the center, where Japs in about company strength were discovered in a pretty well built position behind a small stream. There was a little fire fight with this gang. The 1st Regiment pushed on toward the airfield; it met one really formidable road block with a lot of bunkers and artillery positions and carried it with a rush and the help of tanks. Most of the guns were captured unmanned, a fact which caused a good deal of speculation in our lines at the time, but the explanation was really simple. The original landing and quick, deep penetration in the Target Hill area had cut off many of the Jap artillerists

The attack on the field had originally been scheduled for noon of that day, with the 5th sliding leftward past the rear of the 1st in the kunai grass area south of the field where it had originally been intended to set down the parachutists, both regiments together then to conduct an envelopment. In the morning the artillery fired preparations for such an attack, giving special attention to the wooded ravines leading from the field southward up to the high mass of Mt Talawe, where the main Jap positions were supposed to be. But the rain had not ceased; the 5th simply could not reach its jump-off line in time and after one postponement and another the hour for the attack was carried over to 1500.

Dark was already close as the four battalions swung forward. The combination of late hour, jungle, rain and the ridges made it a big left wheel instead of the right wheel and envelopment that had been planned. The two battalions of the 1st with their accompanying tanks rushed rapidly through light resistance across fairly good ground on their flank, had both airstrips in their possession, and were digging in, facing south, when operations were called off for the night.



Unfortunately, the operation coincided with the rainy season. Even Jeeps failed against the Cape Gloucester mud. Here a tractor tows a convoy over a bad spot.

The 2d Battalion, 5th, linked up with them and also dug in facing the ravines southward, where patrols had found a number of unoccupied Jap positions. The 1st Battalion, 5th, lost contact with the rest and set up its own little perimeter on a ridge south and somewhat east of the airfield. All expected to be counterattacked during the night but nothing of the kind happened.

What had happened was this: a second artillery preparation had been fired when the attack was postponed and the double rain of shells had produced something like a panic among the defenders of the two airstrips. The Jap colonel in command emerged from an elegantly appointed dugout just in time to catch a shell with the back of his neck and most of his men fled away up the draws of Mt Talawe. During the night, as they were let alone, they began to remember Bushido and to crawl back toward the airfield. As they did so they encountered other crawlers among the range of positions at the outlets of the draws.

When Col Selden sent out a patrol in the morning to find his 1st Battalion, it found instead the Japs in their positions and a fire-fight started. He supported the patrol with a platoon and then with a company. It was not enough; he asked for help from the other regiment, which also sent a company, and that was not enough either but in the meanwhile LtCol Joseph F. Hankins of the 3d Battalion, 1st, had gone forward for a look, and seeing what the front was up against, drew most of his battalion and a platoon of tanks into the fight. At the same time the 1st Battalion, 5th, had of course moved toward the sound of fighting and the direction of its move brought in on the

rear of the Jap positions. Before noon they were all taken; at 1300 Gen Rupertus could report to Gen Krueger that point and airfield were secure. The next day the moves began that brought the 5th and 1st Regiments with the 12th Defense Battalion into the perimeter of our new airfield. The engineers and Seabees incredibly carried a passable two lane road from the old perimeter to the new that same day, 31 December.

All this time the 2d Battalion, 1st, had remained within the small perimeter that had been set up along the ends of ravines running steeply to the sea on the western coast of the peninsula. Patrols went out daily and had a good many minor contacts with the enemy, catching one or two prisoners who belonged to the 53d Regiment of the 17th Jap division. The only thing remarkable about these contacts was that the Japs shuttling around in the jungle never seemed to have any security. Again and again our patrols found a whole platoon asleep or marching along a trail with their rifles slung and no scouts. On the night of 30 December enough of the Japs assembled to try an attack on the battalion's perimeter. It was beaten off with a loss of 83 dead to the enemy, who carried away his wounded to the south and bothered the battalion no more, so that in the early days of January it was withdrawn to its parent regiment around the airfield.

V

THE INVALUABLE NATIVE SCOUTS reported that in spite of the ominous appearance of the Jap 53d Regiment, which had not been counted on, not much was to be expected from the west of the airfield perimeter, where the few enemies

remaining were pulling back in a state of disorganization. At the eastern end around Borgen Bay toward Natamo Point, things were different; Gen Matsuda had pulled his men well together, organized a position and prepared to hold on. This position was centered round the hill rising sharply from the flats of the shore some two miles south of Silimati Point. It was called by us Hill 660 because of its measured height and by the Japs, Manju Yamma which is to say "Sweet Cookie Hill." It is not—like Target Hill—a bald-top, but heavily overgrown with tall jungle trees; and it was within artillery range of the newly captured airfield, so the strips would not be of much use to us till it was taken.

On 29 December, when it was clear that the airfield would soon be captured, Gen Rupertus assigned the job of clearing this southern flank to Gen Shepherd, with a separate command consisting of the 7th Regiment, the 3d Battalion, 5th, two battalions of artillery and one of engineers. His battalions in line were in order from south to north the 1, 2, 3, of 7, then the 3d of the 5th, with the stream (nameless) running from north to south across the front of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th, and the enemy fixed position facing the former battalion.

The general planned to advance by the right flank, sending the 3d Battalion, 5th (LtCol David S. McDougal) well inland to sweep round, passing the front of the 3d Battalion, 7th (LtCol William R. Williams) to let it across the river, and both abreast coming down the west bank till the front of the 2d Battalion, 7th (LtCol Odell M. Conoley) was cleared and the position facing it taken. That battalion would then be available as a reserve and the other two would be linked up with Battalion 1, 7th (LtCol John E. Weber). A direct attack southward would be carried forward by all three till the next obstacle was met, when the reserve battalion could be used for a second end run. The forces involved were small, the weapons wholly different, but it is worth remarking that here was an approximation amounting to an identity with that most famous of all campaigns in which superior numbers were used against fortified lines—William Tecumseh Sherman's drive through the hills to Atlanta.

As in that classic of the soldier's art, the numbers were not so very superior either (Gen Matsuda still had practically all his 141st Regiment and some scattering), the enemy both determined and alert to the possibilities of counter-




A small tractor bogs down in a stream and has to be snaked out by a bigger "Cat."

attack, and the geography far from favorable. On the first day, 2 January, McDougal's 3d Battalion, 5th, got into trouble with the tall, knife-edged kunai grass, did not enter the jungle rim till noon and at 1545, when it began to get intense sniper fire, was out of touch with the 3d Battalion, 7th. The latter had not yet crossed the stream when it was time to dig in for the night and during the night Matsuda lashed back in a violent counterattack against Target Hill, with a covering attack across the stream against Conoley's 2d Battalion, 7th. The Japs spent most of the night cutting steps in the face of Target Hill and toward dawn came right up, every gun they had pounding the summit from the rear. It was hot work for a while, but the Marine artillery silenced the Japanese, then turned to

A jeep ambulance with a wounded marine is manhandled through a mucky stream.





Blue Beach, Cape Gloucester: An LCM unloads its cargo at a SeaBee built pier with the aid of a self-propelled crane.

on their infantry and the nearest the monkeys got to our lines was 20 yards. When the patrols went out to count the enemy dead they found a document on one of them:

"In today's battle, the Abe Company, as the leading company in the attack, succeeded in breaking through and taking Target Hill. However the enemy, with fierce artillery fire and fierce bombing counterattacked but nothing can induce us to give up our positions." It was a carbon copy, for the original had gone to higher echelons, and it was a lie.

On the attack front Col McDougal gained only a few hundred yards through the jungle, most on his right; the 3d Battalion, 7th, gained nothing at all beyond getting partly across the stream to link with McDougal. This left the front at nightfall of 3 January a U; the series of Jap strongpoints was in the cup. At this point the resemblance to Sherman's famous campaign increases; the engineers became the determining factor. All of both days they had labored to put a corduroy road through swamp and jungle to what had now been dubbed "Suicide Creek"; on the evening of 3 January a bulldozer pushed forward to cut down the bank so tanks could cross. The operator was promptly shot. A volunteer replaced him while a platoon of pioneers took on the Jap snipers who were holding matters up, and by the hour for digging in a practicable passage had been made.

That was the payoff. Next morning, 4 January,

three big tanks stuck their ugly snoots into the middle of the Jap position, blew up its bunkers one after the other, and flushed their remaining defenders for McDougal's men to shoot down. By night the line was as Gen Shepherd planned it, across the stream and well south of Target Hill. The 2d Battalion, 7th, had already swung wide to prolong the western flank of the 3d Battalion, 5th.

5 January was a day of patrolling and preparation for the next jump. Just ahead of the left center of the line was a hill

called Hill 150, and between it and the coastal trail, a swamp even more gelatinous than most of the Cape Gloucester ground. One of the captured documents was an order that "Aogiri Ridge" must be held at all costs, with a sketch map that seemed to identify Hill 150 as the ridge in question. Gen Shepherd planned an attack on it by the 1st Battalion, 7th and 3d Battalion, 5th, converging, while the 2d Battalion, 7th, swept in from the flank and the 3d Battalion, 7th was pinched out of line. One company from the 1st Battalion, 7th, was to move along the coastal trail outside the swamp, with tank support.

It turned out that the information was everywhere wrong or incomplete. Hill 150 was not Aogiri Ridge, in fact it was not occupied at all, and was taken with ease by the rightmost elements of Battalion 1, 7th, and left to Battalion 3, 5th. But south of it was a heavily wooded bottom with another hill behind, and in this bottom the Japs had established themselves in so great strength that neither the right of 3/5 nor all the efforts of 2/7 could make them budge an inch. Col McDougal was badly wounded and had to be replaced by LtCol Lewis Walt from the 7th.

The left of 1st Battalion, 7th, found a heavy and well defended road block on the sandspit along the shore with a stream in front of it that was too much for the tanks. Here again a bulldozer solved the problem under fire, but the bottom ground at the center of the line was still not cleaned out by the evening of the next day.

Only the engineers made progress; they had discovered Hill 150 was just what they wanted and were taking its red cinder ash apart bit by bit as fill for their corduroy.

On 8 January the 3d Battalion, 5th, managed an advance through its sector of the bottom ground and found itself on the lower slopes of a high ridge missing from the map, the one terrain feature intelligence had failed to mark. It was the real Aogiri and the fire that came from it was terrific, for there was nothing fake about Matsuda's order that it must be held at any cost. It covered the route to his one remaining and very slender supply dump in the rear and the men who had escaped the shock at the landing beaches had only a couple days' rice beside what was in that dump.

✻ ALL THAT DAY the battalion moved forward by inches, taking heavy casualties. "We were five days in the swamp," says one private who was there. "You could hardly walk. If you'd try to watch where you were stepping the vines would cut your face. We got to a swollen stream and tried to cross. When we were waist deep in water they let us have it. Some of us ducked behind logs, and some got hit and went under. I began to pray. I prayed to keep awake when I was on watch. I prayed most of the time, I guess, except when I was thinking. I'd lie there with my face as deep in the ground as I could get it, and I'd fix my eyes on something. Once it was an ant. I wanted more than anything else to be an ant. Once it was a blade of grass. It started me thinking about all sorts of things. I was in a daze, forgot where I was. All of a sudden I'd be in Forest Park, St. Louis, lying in the grass like I used to. Then a machine gun would open up, and you couldn't make up your mind where you were—in St. Louis or out in this beat-up jungle. When the order came to get up and charge you'd just go ahead—half of you in Forest Park and half on Hill 660."

Col Walt practically carried the battalion in on his shoulders, himself lugging forward a 37 to the edges of the ridge where he could open fire. On the night of 9 January, with the lines only ten yards apart in some places, Gen Matsuda decided it was time for a counterattack on the exhausted men who had settled on his ridge, in order to knock out the troops there before our tanks could come up. It was touch and go all night; the enemy had made five formal assaults, once ammunition almost ran out, and

once our artillery was firing only 50 yards in front of the lines, but the place was held. That seemed to break the hearts of the enemy; when the tanks came up on the 10th the line everywhere pushed ahead and Aogiri was ours.

All was now ready for the final job, the capture of Hill 660 itself. On the right the 2d Battalion, 7th, had reached a position which Gen Shepherd considered valid for the permanent perimeter. He ordered that battalion to dig and wire in where it stood. On the left center the 3d Battalion, 7th, now under command of LtCol Henry W. Buse, was ordered to make a direct assault on the hill while the 1st Battalion, 7th, swung to its own right and covered the flank of the advance. Meanwhile a patrol scouting the base of 660 found nobody holding the coastal track running down from it. General Shepherd set up an odd little task force consisting of a weapons company, two light tanks, a rocket DUKW and some pioneers with bulldozers; they were to work along the track and set up their own little perimeter at the base of the tall eminence to keep the enemy from escaping. This force, under Capt Joseph E. Buckley, was in position by the night of the 11th and on the morning of the 13th Col Buse tried his direct assault.

✻ IT FAILED; the fire was too heavy. He dug in for the night in possession of the lower slopes and next morning tried a different tack, directing his main effort toward working around the west face of the hill, past some ravines where the tanks could not follow, till he reached the south slope. Hill 660 is almost sheer cliff at this point, but he sent the men up it, climbing by handholds. It was the decisive event, for the Japs did not wake up till the Marines had already reached the crest of Sweet Cookie and began to plaster them with close-in mortar fire. Some of them died at their guns, more fled toward Buckley or scattered down the slope, and the campaign was over in a practical sense, though twice in the succeeding few days small groups of the enemy did assemble for banzai charges. It was also the end of Matsuda's command, for if any of his men reached Rabaul by the impossible jungle trails it was an accident, since they were without food, medical supplies or transportation. The 5th Air Force had its new field, and the campaign had cost that 1st Division 296 killed, 1,036 wounded. Strategically, the operation was very nearly useless.

to be continued

Naval Aviation In 1947

THE STEADY DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT, particularly in the field of jet propulsion, has been marked by achievements in the speed of streamlined planes that have challenged or broken records.

Highlights in the record breaking flights of the Navy include those of Comdr Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., USN, and Maj Marion E. Carl, USMC. Piloting the Douglas Skystreak at 640.7 miles per hour, Comdr Caldwell broke the world record on 20 August 1947 at Muroc Dry Lake, California. Five days later flying the same Skystreak over the course, Maj Carl broke the world record again at a speed of 650.6 miles per hour.

On 27 October 1946, the XM-1 airship took off from Lakehurst, New Jersey, to set a new maximum endurance record (without re-fueling). The airship, which was captained by Lt H. R. Walton, USNR, set a record of 170.3 hours.

At the Cleveland National Aircraft Show in November 1946, the F8F Bearcat took off from a standing start and after a 115-foot run climbed to 10,000 feet in 100 seconds for a new record. The record-setting feat was performed by Lt Comdr M. V. Davenport, USN, Patuxent, Md.

The world distance record made by the Truculent Turtle, the P2V Neptune, 29 September-1 October 1946, flying 11,236 miles from Perth, Australia, to Columbus, Ohio, remains unbroken. Time of flight was 55 hours, 18 minutes. Encouraged by the remarkable record of the Turtle, the Navy has ordered many more of these distance-challenging patrol planes.

Another important record established by Navy during the past year was that of safety. On 1 January 1947, the Naval Air Transportation Service, known as NATS, announced that over a period of five years flying 172 R5Ds, they have flown 68,000,000 plane miles with but one accident, resulting in the death of one crew member. No passenger fatalities have ever occurred in this type plane.

On 9 November 1946, the Navy's new Lockheed Constitution, largest transport in the world, made its first flight at Burbank, California. This 92-ton, four engine monoplane, designated the XR60-1, carries 168 passengers in three cabins on two separate decks. Its four Wasp Major engines provide 14,000 horsepower for take-off. With a top speed of over 300 miles per hour and

a useful load of 69,000 pounds, it offers new possibilities in transportation.

During the past year, Navy organized its first jet fighter squadron. In addition to FH-1, Phantom, Navy all jet fighters include the F2H-1, the FJ-1 and the F6U-1 Pirate. The F2H-1, known as the Banshee and built by McDonnell, resembles the Navy's first carrier-based jet-fighter, the Phantom. Two turbojet engines which are installed in the wing roots give it a speed of over 600 miles per hour. In contrast to the Banshee, the FJ-1 built by North American and the F6U-1 built by Chance Vought are powered by single turbojet engines.

In attack planes, the AM-1 Mauler, a carrier-based torpedo plane built by Glenn Martin, and the AD-1 built by Douglas are powered by conventional engines. Several squadrons are now using the AD-1.

Still other new planes are the XP4M-1, the Mercator, Martin's long-range patrol plane, powered with two jet and two conventional engines, and the PBM 5A, the world's largest amphibian, successor to the Mariner.

Helicopters are rapidly gaining favor, and the Navy is now using such craft aboard carriers for various purposes, particularly transportation between vessels and air-sea rescue. The Sikorsky HO3S-1 was used in Operation Highjump in the Antarctica last Winter.

Naval aviation maintains a force of almost 8,000 aircraft in operation, including fleet, training, and reserve. To support these operating aircraft, approximately 7,000 planes are in storage, pool, and overhaul activities. During the past year the Navy has trained 1800 pilots and more than 15,000 technicians.

Supporting the regular forces of the naval aeronautical organization is the Air Reserve which has more than doubled its size since October 1946. There are now 45,000 officers and men in the Navy and Marine Corps Air Reserve, of which 20,000 participate in organized Naval Air Reserve training activity. The goal for the next year is 40,000 in the organized program.

The Marine Corps has at present 24 squadrons in the active reserve, including air warning squadrons. Marine detachments are located at most Naval Air Reserve Training stations.

—Navy Release.

In Brief

Emergency spurts of speeds for jet-propelled combat planes will result from a development of the Ryan Aeronautical Company which the makers call an "after burner." It is a type of ramjet engine attached, as an integral part, to the after end of the jet engine. The ramjet effect is obtained by spraying fuel into the special tail-pipe where its burning adds mass and velocity to the speeding gases of the jet stream.

War research is taking five out of every six dollars the Government spends on scientific projects. Hundreds of millions of dollars are being spent on preparation for possible war in the stratosphere, war involving super speeds, and war in arctic cold. Total Federal research expenditures for the fiscal year are almost 624 million dollars with 520 million of it marked for war.

College aptitude tests will be given marines and sailors in 550 cities throughout the United States, Alaska, and Hawaii on 13 Dec 1947 in the first step in the selection of 2,500 candidates who will be given a four-year Navy subsidized college education under the NROTC program. The candidates selected will begin the 1948 fall terms at one of 52 colleges and universities in which the NROTC program is offered.

The world's largest overhead crane installation, capable of lifting 1,008,000 pounds of dead weight at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard, and featuring a new system of hoist control, will be operated by enough horsepower to run 10,000 washing machines. The giant lift will raise the turret from a battleship like lifting a child from a cradle and move it anywhere in a two-block area for repairs.

The Marine Corps' *first jet fighter squadron* is being organized at the Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N. C. The squadron, expected to be the forerunner of several jet fighter units, will be gradually converted from Marine Corsair Squadron VMF 122. The McDonnell FH-1 Phantom jets and new F4U-5 Corsairs will be used to train the pilots of the squadron.

A *new Navy postgraduate school* to be at Monterey, Calif., has been authorized by Congress and signed into law by the President. An appropriation of 2.5 million dollars has been authorized to purchase the Del Monte Hotel and equip it to accommodate from 500 to 600 line officers. The present post-graduate school at the Naval Academy will be separated from the Academy.

To *lend realism to field training* the Army at the Ground General School Center, Fort Riley, Kansas, has organized an "enemy" army called the Aggressors. The Aggressors, who are distinguished by their distinctive helmets, uniforms, and insignia, are armed for field problems with weapons capable of both real and simulated fire.

The *heaviest bomb ever made*—a 42,000 pounder, can be carried in a modified B-29 Superfortress. A part of the body section under the plane's wing must be cut away to make room for the huge bomb. Although the missile is the heaviest airborne bomb load in the history of war planes, Air Forces Ordnance is working on the production of bombs weighing up to 100,000 pounds.

During a *recent mobilization test*, 17 Marine Corps Reserve Squadrons from all over the Atlantic Seaboard flew to Cherry Point, N. C., in a single day. At El Toro, Calif., bad weather and longer distances required three days to mobilize 15 squadrons. At both air stations, civilian "week-end" pilots and ground personnel spent two weeks on active duty.

TO THE EDITOR

Message Center

"Rifleman-Historian" . . .

DEAR SIR,

I read with a great deal of interest the article *Combat Historians?* by Maj Robert D. Heinl, Jr., in the September issue, especially since it may at first seem to be an answer to my own problem of how to improve the accuracy of combat reporting (*Combat Reports* in the August issue of the GAZETTE).

I agree with Maj Heinl that the "missing link in the Marine Corps story of World War II is . . . the lack . . . of coverage by trained historical personnel." However I do not believe that his proposed solution will bring us any nearer to accurate combat reporting than the methods employed in the past. While our ideal should be to achieve the "powerful corrective of on-the-spot coverage by professional historians" it could never be achieved by an organization as small as that proposed by Maj Heinl. How is it possible to, "with maximum accuracy and detail," present an operational report that depended upon, for its accuracy, a field unit that consisted only of two officers and five enlisted men?

Most of the official accounts of Marine actions were written from the official intelligence reports. The Marine Corps had a trained intelligence officer and his enlisted section in each infantry battalion, and we still received inaccurate reports of action. While it is true that the professional historian would probably be more expert in the interpretation and preparation, the basic difficulty is not solved by the presence of such experts. The basic need is for personnel in units as low as the rifle squad to be able

to report accurately the events of an action. The difficulty in the past has not been in the interpretation of the facts, but in determining exactly *what* these facts were. Since the Marine Corps is a military organization and not an historical society it is unlikely that we shall ever have a fourteenth man in the rifle squad who will be called a "rifleman-historian."

If we can be sure that our raw material (dates, times, incidents, etc.) are correct, it would seem to me that the divisional headquarters historical team is all that would be practical for the evaluation and organization of a combat report at this level. The primary duty of this headquarters team should be to hold squad and platoon critiques as soon as possible after a combat action. This could be done, partially, during the combat period when a unit has been brought to the rear for rest, and completed later when the unit has returned to a permanent camp. At any rate it is the only practical way, that I can see, of finding out what really *did* happen. Even if we achieved the *reductio ad absurdum* of having a professional historian with each squad, he would not be able to report accurately on the squad's action because a squad's action is, in reality, the separate actions of 13 marines.

I sincerely believe that our solution is in the critical interview or critique of the small unit immediately after an action by an individual trained for this work, and not in the "roving center, moving to each zone of highest interest in the matter."

CHARLES J. SETZER,
First Lieutenant, USMCR

"Faded" Khaki . . .

DEAR SIR:

In the August issue of the GAZETTE, you published a letter under the signature of SgtMaj Gordon F. Oglivie in which the sergeant expressed his annoyance concerning the summer service uniform.

His dissatisfaction with the design of the summer uniform is popular and, perhaps, warranted. However, his statements that contractors have taken "horrid and ghastly delight in using dyes of various permanence" and "the Marine Corps itself has performed some outstanding feats in changing the speci-

Each month the GAZETTE will pay five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Signatures will be withheld if requested.

fications of the cloth from year to year" (my emphasis) are definitely all wet and an injustice to those responsible for upholding the high standards of Marine Corps fabrics. The facts in connection with the above are as follows:

- (1) For the past 15 years, the subject material has dyed with "vat" dyes, which type dye is in accordance with the highest standards developed by the chemical and dyestuff industry. Further, the subject cloth is tested in many scientific ways to insure its fastness properties, several of which tests are as follows:
 - (a) Thirty minutes in a washing machine containing a solution of soap and soda and held at a high temperature.
 - (b) Agitated in a solution containing chlorine for one hour.
 - (c) Wet out in an acid solution, rolled with undyed material and allowed to stand for 24 hours.
 - (d) Wet out with water and rubbed 20 times in one spot under 32 ounce pressure.

No change in shade is permitted after these tests.
- (2) The specification for the subject cloth has not been changed since 1942 and this change had nothing to do with construction, dyeing or finishing.

Could be that the trousers the Sergeant is referring to as bleaching out after six washings, were individually purchased from a "Market Street Army-Navy Store."

JOHN M. FRASER,
Warrant Officer, USMC

Pratt-Fall . . .

DEAR SIR:

In Chapter 16 of *The Marines in the Pacific War*, Fletcher Pratt infers that the III Phib Corps Artillery changed its plans after Saipan and before Guam. This is absolutely untrue. The artillery plans he refers to were made and thoroughly rehearsed in May 1944 before the III Phib Corps ever left Guadalcanal. These original plans were carried out to the letter at Guam on William Day. His reference that the artillery was landed very early in Guam is true, but as early a bird as the artillery was that day, it was not fast enough on the draw to fire, as Mr Pratt so simply puts it "anywhere from 300 to 750 yards, depending on the elevation." Such procedure would have been a reversion to the days of chain, cannister, and grapeshot.



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With H-hour at 0830, the 12th Marines had reconnaissance parties, led by the regimental commander and battalion commanders, on the beach as early as 0900. The first 105mm howitzers started landing at 1040 and the 3d Battalion opened fire by air spot at 1220. One of the 3d Battalion's first missions was fired at a range of only 2200 yards, and, although FOs controlled the fire, the cannoneers could see their own rounds bursting on the forward slopes of Fonte Ridge.

The 4th Battalion (105mm) was in position and firing by 1300, but the 1st and 2d Battalions (75mm Pack-How) ran into serious trouble. Heavy casualties to LVTs off Red Beach left these two battalions partially stranded at the reef edge in LCVPs. Accordingly both battalions pitched in and manhandled some guns, ammunition, and equipment over the reefs into firing positions ashore, both battalions opening fire between 1300 and 1400.

By about 1700, William Day, the entire 12th Marines was in position, batteries and battalions tied in by survey, communications in, and the regiment capable of firing all battalions under regimental control.

A. L. BOWSER, JR.,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

✓ Check List

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The Coco Patrol

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patrol would be attacked and annihilated by inhospitable bandits, made no secret of their desire to turn back. That night, one was allowed to overhear Edson's rather grisly notions about "accident" prevention; thereafter, the boats were steadier.

Finally, the patrol flushed two Sandinistas who ducked into the brush just ahead of several slugs. Edson knew that surprise was lost, and put small patrols on both banks of the river ahead of his vulnerable, pole-driven convoy. This system paid off when the patrol ran into Sandino's main body—sixty strong against forty-odd Marines. The ambush was well laid and bolstered with machine guns and automatic rifles, but the bandits opened fire too soon when they were spotted by Edson's advance guard. It was a hot little fight, even so.

With three men, Edson dashed to the shore and almost immediately found himself looking down the muzzle of an outlaw rifle. Lurching his pistol, he was horrified to hear a harmless click as the hammer fell on a defective cartridge. Fortunately, and almost at the same moment, he tripped on a vine and fell flat. The bandit missed, but Edson's runner, close behind, did not: the Sandinista was dead before he could work his bolt.

The shooting on the Coco lasted about three hours. After that, the bandits reconciled to the failure of their ambush and discouraged by Edson's aggressive flanking movements, left the field of battle. They left also ten of their dead. The Marines had one dead, three wounded, and Edson reported the morale as excellent.

Ten days later, the patrol was in Poteca, Sandino's stronghold. They did not find Sandino, as he had discreetly gone to the bush. Two additional contacts, though minor, had produced a prisoner—one of Sandino's colonels—and a supply of clothing. Edson's men, who had not shaved for over a month, were in tatters—more ragged, in fact, than any Sandinista. Turned out in straw hats and blue denim, they presented a somewhat smarter appearance.

Reporting to the Major General Commandant, the Brigade commander said of the Coco Patrol: "From the standpoint of difficulty, danger, isolation from friendly ground troops, and accomplishments, this small expedition is without parallel in the hard work done by this Brigade."

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The Coco Patrol

YOU CAN SEE it on the map today: the Rio Coco, snaking its way across two-thirds of Nicaragua and rushing into the Caribbean along the Honduran border. It is still a wild river, swift and full of treacherous rapids, but in 1928 it was not yet so wild as the jungles which crowded its banks. For the Coco then belonged to Augustino Sandino and his bandits: they used the river as a route of communications and supply.

This Sandino was in very bad odor with the stabilizing force of Marines then serving in Nicaragua. BrigGen Logan Feland, commander of the 2d Brigade, expressed himself as wanting the fellow caught, and a number of unsuccessful efforts were made in this direction. Over on the east coast, Capt Merritt A. Edson, who had been put ashore with the detachment from the *Denver*, suggested a new tack: he proposed to take a patrol in boats up the Coco some four hundred miles to a place called Poteca, where intelligence had placed Sandino's headquarters.

Eighteen days up the river, Capt Edson regretted his proposal. He had cause to curse the incessant rain, the snakes and bugs, and above all, the Coco. Of the patrol's rations, there remained only coffee, flour, and a little bacon, the rest having been lost from the tricky native boats which turned bottom-side up with monotonous regularity. The country along the river had turned out to be singularly barren of food, and the only other source of supply was the Marine air patrol. These small scout planes contacted Edson's patrol at irregular intervals and dropped messages and emergency supplies in small quantities.

As the patrol got farther into bandit territory, the boats began to capsize with exasperating frequency. Edson eyed his Indian boatmen and reflected that some of the "accidents" on the river seemed not so accidental. The Indians, who were sure the

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